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Abstract: One of the main concerns of Latin Americans today is the lack of adequate
employment opportunities. This concern is based on the widespread perception that
not enough employment is being generated, and that few individuals have access to
well-remunerated jobs. This work asks whether there is a supply-side story to be told
about these outcomes. We present stylized facts about the connection between the
demographic transition and changes in education (the size and quality of the labor
force), with labor supply, inequality, and unemployment. The main conclusion is that
demographics and education significantly improve our understanding on the overall
decline in employment, the changing pattern of unemployment, and the rise in wage
inequality. By adding them to the demand and institutional factors behind these
outcomes, we obtain a clearer picture about labor markets in Latin America. Although
demographics and education move slowly through time and have a strong inertial
component, there is still a wide scope for policies that move these variables in a
direction that produced better labor market outcomes.
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Labor Markets in Latin America:See Latinobarometro (1997), and Lora and Marquez (1998).
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Lora and Olivera (1998) and Lora and Marquez (1998) present some evidence on this. In Section III of
2
this work we document this fact for several Latin American countries with data from household surveys.
Specially around the relationship between trade liberalization or privatization programs, and the demand
3
for particular kinds of labor (some examples are Robbins (1996) and Lora and Olivera (1998)).





One of the main concerns of Latin Americans today is the lack of adequate employment
opportunities.  This concern is based on the widespread perception that not enough employment is
1
being generated, and that few individuals have access to well-remunerated jobs. The perceptions find
some support in several statistical sources. For instance, ILO (1997) shows that during the 1990s the
rate of growth of employment in most Latin American countries slowed down, while unemployment
rates declined in only a few countries.  Also, there is some evidence that the distribution of wages has
deteriorated in the region.
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Most of the debate on employment, unemployment and inequality has concentrated on the demand
side of the problem - particularly, on determining the extent to which these changes are associated
with stabilization policies and economic reform.   There has also been growing interest on the role
3
played by labor market institutions.   These approaches are necessary for understanding the changes
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in labor market outcomes in the region, but there are other major transformations taking place in
Latin America  that have not been part of the discussion. Specifically, not much has been said about
the role played by changes in the determinants of labor supply.
This paper argues that the factors affecting labor supply have also been driving the reductions in
employment growth, the changes in unemployment and the increases in wage inequality in Latin
America during the 1990s.
The two main forces driving labor supply in the region have been demographics and education. The
major transformation in demographics is that Latin America is starting to age.  The reduction in
population growth since the mid 1960s has triggered sharp changes in the age composition of the
population in subsequent decades. One important consequence is that new generations are
successively smaller and thus the growth rate of the  working age population is falling. Another
consequence is that the share of relatively older age groups is increasing.
With regard  to education, younger generations  are increasingly more educated than older ones, but2
progress has nevertheless been strikingly slow.  Perhaps the most important transformation in
education is that the variance of schooling within countries have been expanding in recent years.  One
important exception is a reversal of the gender gap.  Women are now advancing faster than men
through the education system and attaining higher schooling levels on average.
Demographics and schooling affect employment through two main channels. First, there is an impact
through population growth. Between the 1980s and 1990s there was a deceleration in the growth of
employment mainly because the rate of growth of the working age population -- caused by earlier
reductions in fertility -- slowed down. Second, there is an impact through fertility, age composition
and education. During the 1980s the proportion of females participating in the labor market increased
sharply and this, in turn, increased labor supply and overall employment growth.  In the 1990s, some
of the same factors which led to rising female participation rates began to diminish.  Perhaps the
largest effect was due to the relatively large share of women in the 30-39 age group - an age at which
participation rates peak for women.  During the 1990s participation did not continue to expand at the
same pace in part because the share of older women -- who tend to participate less -- started to grow,
and this contributed to the deceleration in employment growth.
Demographics and education affected unemployment in the 1990s, as well. The share of young work
force entrants declined in the 1990s relative to the 1980s.  This had a moderating effect on
unemployment rates in most countries because the young typically have unemployment rates which
are four times greater than for older workers.  This led the “natural” rate of unemployment, which
is affected by the proportion of individuals  entering the market for the first time, to be somewhat
lower. By contrast, the share of young women entering the labor force increased due to
improvements in education, reductions in fertility and changes in the age composition of the labor
force.  Since differences in unemployment are even more striking among women -- unemployment
rates are eight times greater for younger women than older ones -- and since their participation rates
have remained at high levels, they have contributed toward keeping overall unemployment rates high.
The demographic transition and changes in schooling also have strong effects on wage inequality and
income differentials through three key mechanisms. First, inequality is affected by changes in the age
structure of the population. Income inequality among young workers is generally half as large as for
older workers.  As each cohort ages, the more educated individuals in that cohort experience
substantial increases in earnings, while the earnings of poorly educated workers do not increase
substantially.  Since older cohorts have greater income inequality, the aging of the Latin American
population is leading to higher aggregate measures of income inequality.
Second, wage inequality is also rising because the distribution of education has been changing.
Consider a non-mean adjusted measure of inequality such as the variance of schooling.  In a seeming
paradox, the variance of schooling has increased at the same time that average educational attainment
has increased and the variance has fallen within younger age groups.  There are two effects associated
with this phenomena.  The first is related to differences in mean levels of educational attainment
across generations.   When new generations with more years of schooling enter the market, the
difference between them and older generations increases the absolute disparity of educationalUN population statistics, 1996 revision (See UN ( 1997)).
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attainment.  The second reason is that the dispersion of schooling within cohorts is not constant.
Consider the process of advancing from a condition of universally low levels of schooling.  At the
beginning of the process the differences within a given cohort are small since almost everyone has no
schooling. As schooling improves, some people receive more education, leading to larger educational
differences.  By the end of the process, schooling levels are universally high, and the differences
within the young age groups will again be small. All the countries in the region are at the stage in
which  each new generation now has a lower variance of schooling than its predecessor.  However,
in many countries the oldest generations have even lower variances of schooling so the net effect of
the entry and exit effects is to increase the overall variance of schooling.  Although this is largely a
statistical artifact, and all relative measures of schooling inequality have declined,  this “Kuznetzian”
process has important implications for wage inequality. 
Third, since educational progress has been so low -- it has taken 10 years to raise the average level
of schooling by 1 year in the region -- the growth in the supply of the highest skills has been slow,
and has not been able to keep pace with demand. Other things being equal, this tends to raise the
wages of highly skilled employees relative to unskilled employees, and thereby contributes to
widening the income gap between highly and poorly educated individuals.
Apart from the impact that demographics and schooling have had on labor supply in Latin America
during the 1990s, these two variables will play an even more important role in the determination of
employment, unemployment and inequality in the future. The expected changes provide a good guide
for policy discussions about the supply-side of the problem.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section I describes the key trends in demographics and
education in more detail. Section II discusses the impact of these two variables on labor supply and
employment, while Section III looks at the implications for unemployment. Section IV studies the
connection between these determinants of the changes in labor supply and income inequality. Finally,
Section V concludes and describes what the future might look like.
I. Demographic Trends and Education in Latin America
According to the most recent population statistics, Latin America is the second “youngest” region
in the world . The average age is approximately 27 years, which is higher than the average for Africa
5
(22 years), and much lower than in Europe and North America, where the mean is between 36 and
38 years.
Since the mid  1960s, the rate of growth of the population in the region has been declining
consistently. By 1965 the annual rate was  2.7%, but now it is slightly below 1.6%. These reductions
are the result of a long term demographic transition which is common to all countries, and which hasCelade (1996).
6
Calculated from UN (1997) population projections.
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been characterized by CELADE as having four stages : (I) the first stage is characterized by slow
6
population growth (approximately 2.5%) resulting from both high fertility and high mortality rates;
(ii) in the second stage population growth rises (to approximately 3%) because fertility remains high
while mortality rates decline -- particularly among infants; (iii) in the third stage mortality rates remain
low and fertility rates decline, thereby lowering population growth rates (to approximately 2%); (iv)
finally, in the fourth stage fertility and mortality rates are both low, and population growth rates
stabilize (at about 1%). According to this classification scheme Latin America is in the third stage of
the transition together with Asia, while Africa is moving through stage two, and North America and
Europe have entered stage four.
As countries progress through the demographic transition, important changes occur in the age
structure.  For example, in 1950, approximately 40% of the Latin America population was younger
than 14 years of age and its share increased until the 1970s (See Figure 1).   However, as a
consequence of declining fertility rates, this age group’s share declined steadily,  so that by 1997 it
accounted for only about 30% of the population.   At the same time, the share of  20-44 year olds
increased from 31% to 40% of the population. In fact, the relative size of the working age population
has been increasing dramatically since the 1960s, but that process is slowing down, and will stop by
2010.
Figure 2 shows the future stages of the transition by projecting Latin America’s age structure to the
year 2050.  By the year 2010, the proportion of individuals below 35 years of age will start declining
7
sharply, while the groups above 35 will increase in size. In sum, Latin America is ageing, and the
proportion of individuals who are 65 or older is going to increase considerably  through the first half
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Average Age of the Population
in LAC Countries in 1997 and 2020 Figure 3
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These regional averages give a good idea about where Latin America stands in the world, but there
are important differences within the region. For instance, the average age in Latin America ranges
from as low as 22 years in Nicaragua, Honduras and Guatemala, to almost 34 years in Uruguay and
Barbados (See Figure 3). This range within the region is as large as the differences between the
regions of the world. Figure 3 also shows the average age expected in the year 2020. It demonstrates
that demographic differences within the region will increase significantly. While the differences in
average age between the “youngest” and “oldest” countries is now  11.5 years, it will grow to 16
years by 2020.
For the purpose of this work, we have classified Latin America countries into four groups according
to their age structure. First, there are seven countries (Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala, Belize,
Paraguay, Bolivia and Haiti) that are clearly in the second stage of the demographic transition
described above, and in which the population share of the youngest age-groups is highest (see Figure
4a). The next two groups are countries that are in the third stage of transition, but which nonetheless
vary considerably and can be usefully split into two groups.  We classify the “younger” countries in
stage IIIa (El Salvador, Ecuador, Mexico, Venezuela, Peru, Dominican Republic, Colombia and
Costa Rica) and the “older countries”  in stage IIIb ( Panama, Jamaica, Brazil, Chile and Argentina).
Finally, the five countries who have  the lowest proportion of individuals between the ages of zero
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The countries in group II are going to continue to have
high dependency ratios, and a growing work force, because of the continuing expansion of younger
cohorts.  Countries in groups IIIa and IIIb will begin to see dependency ratios drop while work force
growth will begin to slow.  The countries in group IV are already seeing a stabilization of the cohorts
entering the labor force, but will be the first ones to experience rising dependency as a consequence
of the growing elderly population.  These changes in the age composition of the population will have
implications for employment, unemployment, and inequality depending on the characteristics of each
successive generation as they enter the labor force and age.
















































































Africa Latin America East Asia Industrial Countries
Education Levels in the World Figure 5
Source: Calculations from Barro-Lee data
Londoño and Székely (1997) give more details on this.
8
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Apart from the size and age composition of the potential entrants into the labor market, another key
determinant of labor supply is the level and distribution of education. Changes in the level and
distribution of education affect both the quality and quantity of skills available in an economy, and
hence affect average as well as relative wages between groups with different levels of education.
From an international perspective,  Latin America has made strikingly slow progress in education.
8
In 1970, in the industrial countries, the ratio of individuals above 25 years of age with secondary
education or higher to those with primary education or less was only 0.5 (See Figure 5).  By the
1990s, the ratio had almost reversed and now there are around 1.2 persons with at least a secondary
education for each individual with primary education or less. There was also strong improvement in
East Asia, where the ratio rose from around 0.4 in 1970  to more than 0.6 in the early 1990s.  In Latin
America, by contrast,  the ratio rose from less than 0.2 to around 0.25. Thus, there has been a
widening gap between Latin America on the one hand, and East Asia and the industrialized countries
on the other, starting at least as early as 1970. By international standards, higher and secondary
education are relatively more scarce in Latin America than in other regions.
Table 1 presents some comparisons between the Latin American countries calculated from householdTABLE 1
DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION 25 YEARS AND OLDER 
BY EDUCATION LEVEL IN THE 1990'S (PROPORTIONS)
A B C D (A+B)/(C+D) Mean Years
Country and Year No Education Primary Secondary Higher of Schooling
Brazil 95 20.84 45.37 25.59 8.19 1.96 5.24
Chile 94 6.66 43.72 33.31 16.30 1.02 8.79
Colombia 95 10.10 45.26 34.42 10.23 1.24 6.44
Costa Rica 95 8.25 53.33 23.74 14.67 1.60 7.03
Dominican Republic
*
43.80 36.00 11.10 9.10 3.95 ..
Ecuador 95 12.05 47.80 25.47 14.68 1.49 7.10
El Salvador 95 30.20 51.35 10.71 7.74 4.42 4.85
Guatemala* 52.70 37.00 5.90 4.50 8.63 ..
Honduras 96 26.01 52.00 8.29 13.70 3.55 4.70
Jamaica* 4.20 64.20 28.60 3.10 2.16 ..
Mexico 94 20.24 44.23 23.58 11.95 1.81 6.23
Nicaragua 93 33.98 40.28 18.59 7.15 2.89 4.35
Panama 95 6.91 38.53 38.09 16.47 0.83 8.45
Paraguay 95 7.50 62.85 21.95 7.70 2.37 6.09
Peru 96 14.14 33.89 39.26 12.70 0.92 7.20
Trinidad & Tobago* 5.60 62.30 28.60 3.50 2.12 ..
Venezuela 95 12.03 40.68 34.06 13.23 1.11 7.20
Cross Country Average 15.76 39.94 20.56 8.75 2.10 6.44
Argentina 96
1
1.59 48.08 29.03 21.29 0.99 9.49
Bolivia 95
2
11.69 24.08 39.75 24.48 0.56 8.82
Uruguay 95
3
3.60 48.56 33.42 14.42 1.09 8.02
Cross Country Average 5.63 40.24 34.07 20.06 0.88 5.92
Source: Calculations from household survey data
* Source: Calculations from Barro-Lee (1996)
Note:  1- The surveys for Argentina include only Gran Buenos Aires
             2- The surveys for Bolivia include only urban areas
             3- The surveys for Uruguay include only urban areas
This and the following sections heavily rely on calculations from household surveys. A description of the
9
data can be found in the Appendix.
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survey data .  As with the age structure, there are large differences between countries. For instance,
9
in Guatemala about 53% of the population above 25 years of age have no schooling and less than 5%
have higher education. By contrast, in Costa Rica fewer than 10% have no education while about
15% have completed some higher education. In Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago, educational
attainment is quite concentrated among those with primary and secondary schooling.  These countries
have the smallest proportions of uneducated and highly educated individuals, while more than 90%
of the population has primary or secondary education.We processed the data from 26 household surveys belonging to 16 Latin American countries for the
10
longest possible period between 1980 and the 1990s. We chose the longest periods because we are interested in
capturing long run trends. A detailed description of the data can be found in Appendix I. Since the surveys for
Argentina, Bolivia and Uruguay are not nationally representative, the changes in these countries should be
interpreted with care because they are highly influenced by changes in migration and urbanization.
See Barros & Lam (1996) and Duryea (1997) for more details. These authors argue that student
11
attainment in Brazil is low because of high repetition rates, delayed entrance to school and/or high drop out rates at
young ages.
10
Table 1 confirms that individuals with secondary education and above are still a minority in the
region. The number of people with no education or some primary education, relative to the number
of individuals with secondary education or higher education (see the ratio presented in the table) is
particularly high in Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras Nicaragua, Paraguay, Trinidad & Tobago, and
Brazil, where there are on average around 3 individuals with low education for each individual with
secondary or more.  At the other extreme, the lowest ratios are found in Chile, Peru and Paraguay.
The data provide an idea about the stock of education in Latin American countries, but they do not
say much about trends in educational attainment in the region, which are generally poor.  Using
household survey data,  Table 2 presents mean years of schooling for 10, 15, 18 and 25 year olds
10
in ten countries in the region for two points in time, and demonstrates that education policies have
been only moderately successful in raising student achievement.   For instance, in the early 1980s,
11
the typical 15 year old Latin American completed 5.3 years of schooling, and by the mid 1990s that
average had increased only to 5.5.  A 15 year old who begins school at a normal age and proceeds
through school without dropping out or repeating a grade should have completed nine years of
education. Therefore, a very large gap between the expected and the attained level of schooling
remains.
The gap between expected and actual educational attainment is even wider among 18 year olds who
should have completed 11 or 12 years of schooling.  The typical 18 year old Latin American had
completed only 6.2 years of schooling in the early 1980s, while this average had increased marginally
to 6.5 in the 1990s. The gap between the expected and actual educational attainment for 18 year olds
is between 5 and 6 years.  Brazil and Honduras present the biggest lags in attainment, followed by
Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela and Costa Rica. The notable exception is Chile, where the gaps are
much smaller.Table  2.   Mean Schooling Levels For Various Ages and Countries
Age 10 Age 15 Age 18 Age 25
Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls Men Women
Brazil
1981 1.22 1.43 3.86 4.21 5.08 5.42 5.58 5.78
1995 1.73 1.96 4.60 5.24 5.62 6.48 6.45 6.99
Chile 
1987 4.27 4.39 8.44 8.52 9.83 9.91 10.13 10.05
1994 4.13 4.22 8.56 8.65 9.84 10.19 10.95 10.94
Colombia
1995 2.82 2.86 6.20 6.48 7.33 8.15 7.96 8.12
Costa Rica
1981 (3) (3) 6.63 6.79 7.39 7.83 7.67 8.03
1995 2.77 2.91 6.61 6.93 7.59 7.86 8.24 8.65
Ecuador 
1995 3.51 3.54 6.68 7.31 7.96 8.86 9.19 9.76
El Salvador
1995 2.02 2.08 5.13 5.63 6.35 6.83 6.75 7.21
Honduras
1989 1.88 1.91 4.74 4.98 4.99 5.51 5.46 5.65
1996 2.21 2.45 4.96 5.64 5.72 6.28 5.89 6.34
Mexico
1984 2.86 2.91 6.45 6.88 7.65 7.23 7.68 6.70
1994 2.89 2.83 7.08 7.22 8.53 8.33 9.15 8.93
Nicaragua
1993 2.07 2.37 4.47 4.90 5.02 6.15 5.66 5.92
Panama
1995 3.34 3.49 7.14 7.88 8.60 9.53 9.45 10.15
Paraguay
1995 2.53 2.77 6.06 6.20 7.23 7.62 7.43 7.15
Peru
1985 3.50 3.22 6.98 6.77 8.42 8.12 9.21 8.69
1996 2.14 2.02 6.91 7.03 9.13 8.77 9.58 8.80
Venezuela
1981 2.77 3.05 5.95 6.64 7.07 7.83 7.37 7.26
1995 3.50 3.77 6.81 7.55 7.90 8.78 8.44 9.27
Argentina  (1)
1980 3.39 3.58 7.33 8.16 9.55 9.84 10.00 10.20
1996 3.50 3.50 9.02 8.73 10.07 10.61 10.94 11.66
Bolivia  (2)
1986 4.13 3.85 7.98 7.69 10.28 9.54 10.08 9.37
1995 3.57 3.63 8.09 7.82 10.37 9.70 11.20 10.03
Uruguay  (2)
1981 3.23 3.31 7.75 7.65 8.92 9.04 9.64 9.51
1995 3.52 3.68 8.12 8.41 9.44 9.92 10.44 11.01
Note:  (1)  The surveys for Argentina include only the Gran Buenos Aires area.
            (2)  The surveys for Bolivia and Uruguay include only urban areas.
           (3)  These surveys do not report schooling for 10 year olds.
Source:  Duryea and Szekely, 1998, calculations from household surveys.
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12TABLE 2a
SECONDARY COMPLETION RATES BY
GENDER FOR 20-22 YEAR OLDS
(DATA FROM HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS CIRCA 1995)
Country and Year Females Males
Brazil 95 24.35 18.55
Chile 94 58.74 54.62
Colombia 95 43.23 38.23
Costa Rica 95 34.59 30.02
Ecuador 95 38.95 35.30
El Salvador 95 26.35 26.36
Honduras 96 20.63 13.34
Mexico 94 33.04 29.28
Nicaragua 93 16.64 11.97
Panama 95 50.58 44.25
Paraguay 95 24.67 22.17
Peru 96 59.58 63.34










Note:  1- The surveys for Argentina include only Gran Buenos Aires
             2- The surveys for Bolivia include only urban areas
             3- The surveys for Uruguay include only urban areas
Source: Author's calculations
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Figure 5B demonstrates that enrollment in school drops steadily after children reach age 12.  Even
in Mexico, where mean schooling levels are relatively high, enrollment falls from 95% at age 11 to
82% at age 13.  Chile is the sole country which maintains enrollment rates over 90% through age 14,
a necessary but not sufficient condition for attaining almost no gap in expected schooling at age 15
in Table 2.  Brazil’s high repetition rates mean that it’s average standing in the enrollment charts does
not translate to average educational attainment.  Table A4.1 in the appendix lists the enrollment rates
by age for the 12 countries shown in Figure 5B as well as the 3 urban countries.14
Table 2a presents the proportion of 20-22 year olds that have finished their secondary education in
sixteen Latin American countries around 1995 (we choose this group because most individuals are
not likely to continue secondary level education beyond this point). If these individuals had started
school at the normal age (around 6 or 7) and did not interrupt their education, they should have
achieved at least secondary education by this age.  However, a majority of this cohort has not
completed secondary schooling.  On average, only 41% of 20-22 year old males  and 46% of females
have completed their secondary education.  Even though there are differences between countries, the
ratios in all cases are strikingly low. They range from about 21%, 33% and 35% in Honduras, Mexico
and Costa Rica, to almost 60% in Chile. Under the current circumstances, it is unlikely that 20-22
year olds will acquire much more education in the following years. Therefore, a large proportion of
individuals searching for jobs or working in the next 45 years will not have achieved education levels
above secondary.
Moreover, there are substantial differences in education attainment along the income distribution.
Tables A1.2a through A1.2f  in the Appendix show the average years of education by decile of 12,
15, 18 21 and 24 year olds in the 16 Latin American countries for which we have household survey
data. The differences among 12 year olds and even among 15 year olds are not very large (with the
exception of Brazil, El Salvador and Paraguay, where young children in the poorest decile already
show a considerable gap with respect to children in the top 10% at this age). Differences in attainment
start to be more apparent at 18 years of age, where on average a child in the poorest 30% of the
distribution has three years less of education than 18 year olds in the richest 10%. These differentials
expand to around 5 and 6 years for 21 and 24 year olds. 
The slow pace of overall educational progress is also apparent in a longer run perspective.  By
comparing the average educational attainment of individuals born in 1968-70 (who are 25-27 years
old in 1995) to the average for individuals born 30 years earlier (who are 55-57 years old in 1995),
it is apparent that it has taken three decades to increase the average schooling of the typical Latin
American male by three years (See Table 3).  In other words, educational attainment has increased
by only one year per decade. Table 3 also shows that educational progress among women has been
faster, although the levels remain low by international standards.
Among the countries with nationally representative data in this sample Mexico, Peru, Ecuador and
Chile have improved the education across generations relatively faster, while Brazil, Costa Rica and
Paraguay have registered slower progress. Chile has maintained the highest level of schooling in this
sample for both men and women over the entire period. The gain across the 30 years was
approximately three years for males in Colombia, Chile and Peru while it was approximately 2.5 years
for Brazil, Honduras, and Costa Rica, but it should be noted that these last two countries started out
with higher education levels.  Men in Mexico and Ecuador have made larger absolute improvements
across generations than men in other countries (men born in the 1968-70 cohorts had on average 4
more years of schooling than men born thirty years earlier).  Mexican and Ecuadoran males born in
the 1930s had very low schooling levels, similar to Brazil,  but the cohorts born since the 1960s have
met or surpassed educational attainment levels in Venezuela, Colombia, and Costa Rica.  By contrast,
Brazilian men have failed to bridge the historical gap of 1.5 years of schooling below Venezuelan  The possible exception is Peru, where 18 and 25 year old men have higher levels of schooling than
12
women.  While girls are on par with boys below the age of 15, it remains to be seen if these girls stop their
schooling at earlier ages than boys.
15
men, and recent cohorts now also lag 1.5 or more years behind Colombia, Costa Rica and Mexico.
Figure A.1 in the appendix demonstrates that the improvements in educational attainment were not
steady over the thirty year period.  In the vast majority of countries the pace of improvements has
unfortunately slowed for cohorts born after the 1960s.  The recent progress in Mexico and Chile
proves that stagnation at a mean level of 8 or 9 years is not inevitable.
In another aspect, relative educational attainment has changed dramatically: the gender gap in
schooling has changed considerably since 1960.  In all thirteen countries women have made larger
gains than men.  In half the countries, the gain for women over the same 30-year period was a year
or more than the gain for men. Table 3 shows that men from the 1938-40 cohort had nearly an
additional year of schooling than women in Chile, Colombia, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay and
Venezuela.  Not only has the advantage been eliminated throughout the region, women now attain
higher mean levels of schooling in Brazil, Venezuela, Honduras, Ecuador, Colombia, El Salvador,
Panama and Nicaragua.   The male education advantage was eliminated among cohorts born  prior
12
to the 1960s in Brazil, Venezuela, Colombia, and Chile and was eliminated more recently in Mexico
and Paraguay. Costa Rica and Panama have historically maintained equal educational attainment for
males and females, although women now enjoy a slight advantage.  It is important to note the stark
contrasts which appear when the data are examined within urban and rural areas.  In many countries
girls still attain lower levels of schooling than boys in rural areas.  The national data shown in Table
2 reflects the favorable standings of girls in urban areas.
Dispersion of Schooling Has Changed in Important Ways
A measure such as the mean years of schooling for the adult population provides a good indicator of
the average level of skill available in the potential labor force, but since Latin America is characterized
by  high inequality, it is also important to consider  how  education is distributed. Table 4 shows
summary measures of the distribution of the stock of education. One striking result is that the
dispersion of the stock of schooling, as measured by the variance,  increased over the 10-15 year
period for both men and women in Brazil, Mexico, Costa Rica, Honduras, and Uruguay.  In Chile,
Venezuela, Argentina and Peru the variance remained about the same for men.  The variance
increased for women more than men in Venezuela, Mexico, Argentina and Bolivia.  While there are
many possible indices with which to measure schooling inequality, we will focus on the variance of
schooling because it is linked to wage inequality through standard labor economic theory.  In fact,
the last column shows that a mean adjusted measures of schooling inequality, such as the coefficient
of variation, fell for all countries in Table 4.  So one could say that “inequality of schooling” fell but
at the same time the increase in the variance of schooling will translate into higher wage inequality.TABLE 3.  MEAN SCHOOLING FOR 1938-40 COHORTS AND 1968-70 COHORTS
(HOUSEHOLD SURVEY DATA CIRCA 1995)
Mean schooling for Mean schooling for Difference in
1938-1940 Cohort 1968-1970 Cohort Mean over 30 Years
Males
Brazil 3.91 6.33 2.42
Chile 7.84 10.94 3.10
Colombia 5.08 7.99 2.92
Costa Rica 5.68 8.18 2.50
Ecuador 4.91 9.19 4.28
El Salvador 3.85 7.18 3.33
Honduras 3.42 6.23 2.81
Mexico 4.52 8.94 4.42
Nicaragua 2.95 5.76 2.81
Panama 6.77 9.64 2.87
Paraguay 5.04 7.68 2.64
Peru 6.33 9.62 3.29
Venezuela 5.89 8.50 2.61
Argentina  (1) 9.15 11.23 2.07
Bolivia   (2) 8.90 11.57 2.67
Uruguay (2) 7.67 10.40 2.72
Females
Brazil 3.54 6.94 3.41
Chile 6.78 11.01 4.22
Colombia 4.34 8.27 3.93
Costa Rica 5.33 8.29 2.96
Ecuador 4.42 9.42 5.00
El Salvador 3.27 6.88 3.61
Honduras 2.74 6.42 3.69
Mexico 3.41 8.77 5.37
Nicaragua 2.69 6.18 3.49
Panama 7.00 10.34 3.34
Paraguay 4.12 7.54 3.42
Peru 4.25 8.56 4.31
Venezuela 5.20 9.20 4.00
Argentina  (1) 8.61 11.65 3.04
Bolivia   (2) 5.66 9.82 4.16
Uruguay (2) 7.40 10.65 3.25
Note:  (1)  The surveys for Argentina include only the Gran Buenos Aires area.
            (2)  The surveys for Bolivia and Uruguay include only urban areas.
Source:  Duryea and Szekely, calculations from household surveys.
16TABLE 4
DISTRIBUTION OF STOCK OF SCHOOLING
AS MEASURED BY THE VARIANCE
POPULATION 25 YEARS AND OLDER
Males Females 
Country Year Mean  Variance Coef. Var. Mean  Variance Coef. Var.
Brazil 1981 4.01 17.62 1.05 3.66 15.83 1.09
1995 5.26 20.82 0.87 5.21 20.53 0.87
Chile 1987 8.39 22.24 0.56 7.88 20.55 0.58
1994 9.01 21.78 0.51 8.57 20.81 0.53
Costa Rica 1981 5.82 17.73 0.72 5.54 15.11 0.70
1995 7.10 19.54 0.62 6.97 18.40 0.62
Honduras 1989 4.01 18.69 1.08 3.71 16.72 1.10
1996 4.79 21.05 0.96 4.61 19.29 0.95
Mexico 1984 5.31 22.30 0.89 4.43 16.40 0.91
1994 6.55 28.98 0.82 5.93 25.51 0.85
Peru 1985 7.47 22.09 0.63 5.47 23.47 0.89
1996 8.04 21.59 0.58 6.42 24.97 0.78
Venezuela 1981 5.86 17.56 0.72 5.14 16.25 0.78
1995 7.01 18.55 0.56 6.82 20.25 0.60
Argentina (1) 1980 7.92 17.14 0.52 7.24 14.71 0.53
1996 8.91 16.24 0.53 8.47 21.84 0.55
Bolivia  (2) 1986 9.06 22.70 0.53 6.96 23.56 0.70
1995 10.03 24.18 0.49 7.72 30.08 0.71
Uruguay  (2) 1981 6.83 16.49 0.59 6.63 15.79 0.60
1995 8.13 18.97 0.54 7.93 19.06 0.55
Note:  (1)  The surveys for Argentina include only the Gran Buenos Aires area.
          (2) The surveys include only urban areas.
Source:  Duryea and Szekely, calculations from household surveys.
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Paradoxically the increase in variance of schooling for the stock of potential workers has coincided
with “improvements” in the distribution of schooling, notably 1) increases in mean schooling and 2)
declines in the variance of schooling for younger generations.  Both of these effects can be regarded
as a natural process of increasing schooling from a lower to an upper bound.  Specifically the variance
of the stock of schooling depends on the disparities between cohorts and is also a function of the
variances within cohorts.  First, when younger groups enter the labor force with higher levels of
education than older groups, the difference between these groups increases the variance of schooling
Second, disparities in educational attainment within generations follow an inverted “U” path through
time. At the beginning of the process schooling levels are universally low and inequality is
correspondingly low.  When some individuals begin completing higher levels of education, the Duryea and Szekely, 1998, decompose the change in overall variance into between and within cohort
13
effects. 
Figure A2 in Appendix I clarifies this. As can be seen, the distribution of schooling in Mexico as
14
measured by the variance, has been lower for each of the new generations since the 1960s, but even so, the
dispersion of the stock of schooling  is increasing. The reason is that the older generations also had very low
education dispersion and as they exit the population, there is an dispersion-increasing effect that dominates the
progressive effect of the new generations. In contrast, Chile has reached the stage at which cohort dispersion is
declining with new generations. This has contributed to the reduction in the variance of schooling since “exiters”
tend to have higher dispersion that the new entrants.
See figure A1 in Appendix I.
15
18
dispersion of schooling within the new generation increases.  In later stages, as primary or secondary
schooling become universal, the dispersion in attainment declines.   The variance of the stock of
13
schooling thus will change as some individuals enter and others exit the population.  In many
countries the “exiters” from the population tend to be old with low variance of schooling which more
than offsets the improvements arising from the incoming generations.
As we mentioned previously, increases in the variance of the stock of schooling does not signify that
recent schooling policies have been a failure.   A good example of these dynamics is Mexico which
14
is illustrated in Appendix FigureA.2.  The variance of the stock of schooling increased by 30%, faster
than any other country in Table 4.  At the same time the mean years of schooling across generations
increased faster than in any other country, and the variance of schooling within recent cohorts has
been declining relatively rapidly in Mexico.    
15
In sum, Latin America has undergone significant changes in its age structure and educational profile
during the last 30 years.  The countries are all progressing through the standard demographic
transition, and are ageing.  In some countries, the population continues to remain fairly young, and
the share of those entering  working age will continue to rise in the near term.  But in most countries,
the share of the very young in the population has stabilized or is even declining.  In education, the
attainment of Latin America’s work force has increased over time, but very slowly relative to other
regions and to expected levels.  Women have made gains that put them on par with or above the
educational attainment of men.  Despite  progress in reducing the relative inequality of schooling, the
distribution of the stock of schooling will put upward pressure on wage inequality among adult
workes.  In the following sections we will show that these changes in demographics and schooling
have had important effects on the behavior of labor markets in the region and, in particular, that they
help to explain the evolution of employment, unemployment and income differentials in Latin America
during the 1990s.ILO (1997) and Lora and Marquez (1998) provide evidence on this.
16
 Psacharopoulos and Tzannatos (1992) already showed that female participation rates increased
17
markedly between the 1960s and the 1980s, and here we extend the analysis to the 1990s.   To produce this figure
we used data from ILO (1997), which includes participation rates for the period 1960-1992. Additionally, we
processed the information in household surveys from Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, Chile, Mexico, Peru,
Venezuela, Honduras and Colombia to obtain estimates for around 1995.
19
II. The Effect of Demographics and Education on Labor Supply and Employment
During the 1990s employment growth slowed down in Latin America.   At first glance this seems
16
rather surprising because the present decade has been one of economic recovery. In this section we
show that one of the reasons for this slowdown is the demographic transition described above.
Demographic changes  have affected employment directly, through a decline in the rate of growth of
the working age population; and indirectly, through a decline in the pace of female labor market
participation resulting from changes in the age structure of the population, reductions in fertility and
higher levels of schooling among females.
The most direct effect of demographic trends upon employment are due to the pace at which young
people enter the labor force.  The relative size of the working age population in Latin America has
been expanding for the past 30 years, as we illustrated in Figure 1, as a consequence of changes in
fertility and mortality. More recently the rate of growth of the working age population has begun to
decline, from a pace of 3% annually during the 1980s, to only 2.5% in the 1990s. If the growth rate
of potential participants in the labor market declines, then employment growth and unemployment
tend to fall.  Therefore, the declining growth of the work force partially explains the decline in
employment growth in the 1990s.
In addition to the declining working age population growth rate, the pace at which participation rates
have increased in recent decades is also moderating.  These changes have been driven mostly by
female participation rates, which, in turn, have been driven by demographic and educational factors.
In this section we give some evidence on the connection.
Figure 6 shows that total labor market participation in Latin America increased from around 64% to
70% during the 1980s, but continued to rise at a much slower pace during the 1990s.  The figure also
shows that practically the entire shift was caused by the substantial increase in female participation.
Women accounted for only 23% of the labor force in 1970, but their share increased to 36% over the
next 26 years.
Figure 7 compares the changes in female participation across countries.  All of the countries for
17
which information is available have followed the same trend during the past 26 years, with the
exception of Haiti, and the largest increases were registered in Paraguay, Colombia, Argentina,
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Source: ILO (1997) and calculations from
household surveys.
20TABLE 5
PARTICIPATION RATES FOR MEN AND WOMEN AGES 30-45 BY LEVEL OF COMPLETED SCHOOLING
A B C D A B C D
Country and Year No Education Primary Secondary Higher No Education Primary Secondary Higher
Brazil 81 0.34 0.37 0.53 0.82 0.95 0.97 0.97 0.98
Brazil 95 0.50 0.57 0.67 0.87 0.92 0.95 0.97 0.98
Chile 87 0.25 0.30 0.39 0.70 0.81 0.94 0.96 0.98
Chile 94 0.34 0.36 0.46 0.74 0.80 0.95 0.98 0.98
Colombia 95 0.42 0.46 0.61 0.87 0.92 0.98 0.98 0.98
Costa Rica 81 0.87 0.91 0.93 0.93 0.91 0.96 0.98 0.93
Costa Rica 95 0.34 0.35 0.48 0.70 0.87 0.97 0.98 0.97
Ecuador 95 0.68 0.61 0.62 0.81 0.88 0.96 0.98 0.98
El Salvador 95 0.41 0.57 0.70 0.90 0.89 0.93 0.94 0.94
Honduras 89 0.26 0.40 0.61 0.76 0.96 0.98 0.95 0.97
Honduras 96 0.32 0.49 0.60 0.72 0.95 0.98 0.98 0.97
Mexico 84 0.37 0.39 0.47 0.72 0.74 0.97 0.98 0.98
Mexico 94 0.37 0.39 0.47 0.72 0.74 0.97 0.98 0.98
Nicaragua 93 0.33 0.49 0.66 0.72 0.90 0.89 0.89 0.95
Panama 95 0.20 0.34 0.55 0.83 0.84 0.96 0.96 0.97
Paraguay 95 0.72 0.73 0.73 0.86 0.79 0.98 0.99 0.99
Peru 85/6 0.82 0.78 0.66 0.78 0.92 0.98 0.96 0.97
Peru 96 0.77 0.71 0.64 0.72 0.89 0.98 0.94 0.97
Venezuela 81 0.23 0.33 0.52 0.76 0.95 0.98 0.98 0.97
Venezuela 95 0.31 0.41 0.60 0.83 0.90 0.97 0.97 0.96
Argentina 81
1 0.63 0.34 0.42 0.71 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.97
Argentina 961
0.64 0.48 0.56 0.80 0.75 0.96 0.98 0.99
Bolivia 862 0.45 0.43 0.48 0.61 0.87 0.96 0.97 0.87
Bolivia 952 0.68 0.68 0.63 0.80 0.95 0.98 0.97 0.96
Uruguay 813 0.47 0.47 0.52 0.80 0.63 0.97 0.98 0.99
Uruguay 953 0.34 0.59 0.73 0.91 0.40 0.97 0.99 0.99
Source: Calculations from household survey data
Note:  1- The surveys for Argentina include only Gran Buenos Aires
             2- The surveys for Bolivia include only urban areas
             3- The surveys for Uruguay include only urban areas
Women Men
21One can also argue that women tend to have fewer children to be able to enter the labor market. The
18
direction of the causality between these two variables is difficult to disentangle.
In the literature on participation in industrialized countries it has been shown that one of the major
19
sources of the rises in female participation has been the change in family structure toward one-person and single-
parent households. We examined this argument by using household survey data for Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Costa Rica, Chile, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela, Honduras and Colombia. Surprisingly, family structures in these
countries have remained very stable for the past 15 years. Interestingly, if there has been any change in household
composition it seems to have been given by a reduction in the importance of nuclear/traditional families, and an
increase in extended households, which is precisely the opposite trend observed in industrial countries.
The only exception is Peru in 1985.
20
This exercise involves a number of econometric problems, such as endogeneity. Appendix II presents a
21
detailed discussion of how we have addressed the issues. For presentation purposes we show the most intuitive
results, but it should be stressed that when one tries to correct for all these potential problems, the conclusions we
obtain are exactly the same.
As we know that income is generally a strong determinant of participation, we test for the significance
22
of average wages, industrial wages, and the minimum wage (equations 1, 2 and 3). Surprisingly we find that each
of these variables has a negative effect on participation, and only the minimum wage continues to be significant
when we control for other variables. One plausible explanation is that wages in Latin America are only relevant for
participation decisions when the family has low income, and as the minimum wage is likely to be closer to the
incomes of the poor than average or industrial wages, it can be capturing an “added worker” effect, where
households have to incorporate more of their members in the labor market when incomes decline. In other words,
participation acts as a buffer stock at low incomes. To verify what type of education has more influence on female
participation, we estimated another set of  regressions (see tables in Appendix II), and found that the positive
relation between average education and participation is totally driven by higher education.
22
Female participation rates are strongly influenced by fertility and education. When fertility rates
decline more women enter the labor market because women with fewer children have more time
available for market oriented activities . The declining fertility rates in the region have allowed more
18
women to enter the labor market, and thereby increased the potential rate of employment growth. 
Increasing education for women has also contributed to higher female labor force participation rates.
19
Table 5 shows that participation rates in Latin America increase considerably with education.   For
20
instance, in Honduras women with no schooling have participation rates of about 32%, while higher
education have a participation rate of 72%. The average ratio between the participation rates of
women in the lowest education category to those in the highest category is approximately one to
three. By contrast, male labor force participation is relatively constant across education groups and
does not vary over time. Therefore, in addition to declining fertility, the rising educational attainment
of women is having a significant impact on the pace of labor supply growth in the region.
To assess the magnitudes of these demographic and schooling effects, we estimate a regression in
which changes in women’s labor supply are a function of changes in education, fertility, and other
control variables.  The results indicate that  reductions in fertility and increases in average education
21
are associated with increases in female participation.
22In this case, we notice that the form of the curve differs across countries. Appendix II contains a set of
23
graphs where we show the age profile of female participation for  23 Latin American countries, and we compare
the rate in the early 1970s, with the latest date available around 1996.




Labor force participation rates vary not only with education but also with age, especially for women.
Therefore, the ageing of Latin America’s population is another factor that would affect female labor
force participation, and thereby labor supply growth.  As shown below, female labor force
participation increased relatively quickly in the 1980s because a large share of women were in the age
group that tends to have the highest participation rates.  By contrast, in the 1990s, this cohort entered
older age groups who are less likely to remain in the labor force.  Hence, the ageing of the population
has also led to a moderation of labor supply growth, through this effect on women’s overall
participation in the labor force.
In Figures 8 and 9, we illustrate the differences in average participation rates for men and women as
a function of their age.  The most notable difference is that the age profile of male participation rates
is characterized by a smooth inverted “U,” while the age profile for females varies markedly across
countries which can be broadly classified in three groups.  In the first of these groups, including
23
countries as diverse as Argentina, Honduras and Trinidad & Tobago, participation rates peak at age
20-29. In the second group, which includes 9 of the 19 countries for which we have data, female
participation rates are characterized by a smoother inverted “U” curve which peaks between 30 and
39 years of age.  In the third group, including Chile, Jamaica, and Panama, the participation rates
peak at around 40 years of age. In all cases, female participation rates fall sharply after 45 years,
instead of declining smoothly as is the case for men.
Latin American female participation rates differ significantly from those of the industrial countries
(See Figure 9).  Female labor force participation rates are much higher in developed countries for all
age groups. The cross sectional data in Figure 9 suggests that female participation rates peak at ages
30-40 but to verify if women change their participation behavior through the life cycle we should
follow the same person trhough time. The data to do this is not available but we can follow the
participation behavior of different birth cohorts from a single country through time. Figure 9a plots
the participation rates of 16 birth cohorts, by using the information from five Brazilian household
surveys comprising the period 1981 to 1995 (the surveys belong to 1981, 1984, 1987, 1990 and
1995) . For instance women born in 1952-54 are observed at ages 27-29 age in 1981, ages 30-32
24
in 1984, ages 33-35 in 1987,  ages 36-39 in 1990, and ages 41-43 in 1995, with the idea that









































































Average Male Participation in LAC
By Age Group in the 1990s Figure 8





















































































Group A LAC Group B LAC Group C LAC Industrial Countries
Female Participation in LAC and
Industrial Countries in the 1990s
Group A: Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Honduras, Paraguay, Trinidad & Tobago, Uruguay
Group B: Venezuela, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Peru, Mexico, Costa rica, Colombia, Brazil,
Guatemala
Group C:  Chile, Jamaica, Panama
Figure 9
Source: ILO (1997) and calculations from
household surveys
2425
The cohort participation patterns in figure 9a reinforces the idea that there is some  relation between
age and participation. Participation does fall at older ages, although not as early or steeply as
represented by the cross-sectional data in Figure 9.  According to the figure, cohorts which were 30
years of age or more in 1981, increased their participation rates when they went from the ages of 30
to around 45, and reduced their participation thereafter.  For instance, at age 36-38 the 1943-45
cohort participated at the rate of 45% in 1981.  Their rate increased to about 50% in 1984 and 1987,
and then started declining as the cohort reached 45-47 years of age in 1990.  By 1995, the cohort was
approximately 46-49 years of age and had a participation rate of around 46%, similar to the rate
observed at age 36 and below the peak reached by age 40. Similar patterns are observed for the 11
cohorts that were ages 30 or more in 1981. 
One interesting aspect of the figure, is that in all cases, younger cohorts have higher participation
rates than older ones.  For instance, the 1952-54 cohort registered a participation rate of 53% in
1987, when they reached age 33-35. In contrast, the cohort born six years earlier (1958-60) registered
a rate of female labor force participation of 45% when they were ages 33-35.  In fact this
phenomenon contributes to the steeper age participation profiles in the cross-sectional survey.  In
other words, if one were to connect the points using the 1981 survey it would appear that women’s
participation is stable or slightly falling between the ages of 30-40.  Arend’s (1997) and Duryea’s
(1995) papers note that increases in educational attainment by successive cohorts of women in Brazil
contributed to the rise in participation rates from 1976-1990. -20  -10  0  10  20  30  40 




(%) With Higher Education
(%) Population in Age 0-9
(%) Population in Age 10-19
(%) Population in Age 20-29
(%) Population in Age 30-39
(%) Population in Age 40-49
1980-1990 1990-1996
What Explains the Change in Female
Labor Market Participation? Figure 10
Source: Authors' calculations.
Specifically, we include the proportion of total population in the 0-9, 10-19, 20-29, 30-39, and 40-49
25
age groups, respectively.
Lower female participation rates are associated with large proportions of the population in the 0-9 age
26
group. On the other hand, higher participation is associated with cases where the relative weight of the 20-29 and
the 30-39 age group increases. Recalling the age-participation profiles presented before, the rates plunge for
women  after 45 years of age, and in line with this finding the regression shows that rises in the population weight
of the 40-49 age group are associated with lower participation. Additionally, it should be noted that the explanatory
power of the independent variables increases from 48% to 59% when we include the age structure of the population
into the regression.
26
Figures 9 and 9a illustrate that the combination of the ageing of the population and the age profile
of female labor force participation rates is a very important determinant of labor supply growth.  To
estimate the effect of these factors on female participation rates, we added several demographic
variables into the base equation (see Appendix II and Table A2.2 for the results).   Fertility and
25
education continue to be good explanatory variables, but now we also find that the demographic
transition is one of the strongest determinants of the sharp rise in female labor market participation
rates in Latin America.  By using the regression results we decompose the changes in participation
26
and summarize our findings in Figure 10.
The figure shows, first, that total participation rates in Latin America increased by approximately 35%It should be stressed that we performed a set of tests to check for the robustness of our econometric
27
results (see Appendix II), and none of our conclusions change.
27
during the 1980s. Around 10 percentage points were associated with reductions in fertility. Another
three percentage points were linked to rising educational attainment; this effect is not that large
because educational progress has been slow and concentrated among younger age groups. The most
striking result is that around 30 percentage points of the increase in participation rates are associated
with the change in the age composition of the population. Specifically, the relative size of the 30-39
age group increased by 15% during the decade, and since this is the group which registers the highest
participation rates, total female participation increased. It can also be seen that the relative size of the
40-49 group -- which registers lower participation rates -- also expanded and this tended to reduce
participation. However, as this expansion was smaller (around 8%), it was offset by the change in the
30-39 age group.
With respect to the 1990s, female participation continued to expand, although at a slower pace. In
the 1980s the average annual increase was of 3.4%, while in the 1990s it fell to 2.4%. As illustrated
in Figure 10, the main difference between the 1980s and 1990s, are the changes in age composition.
During the 1990s, the 30-39 age group continued to expand in relative terms, but it did so by 8%.
In contrast, the 40-49 age group increased its relative size by 15%. So, in the 1990s there were two
age effects that canceled each other. On the one hand, participation tended to rise due to the
expansion of the groups that participate more, but on the other it tended to decline due to the
expansion of the groups that participate less.  As both effects were of similar magnitude, the net
27
effect was small.
In sum, our results show that fertility, schooling and the age structure of the population affect labor
supply through their influence over female participation decisions.
Labor Supply and Employment
Changes in labor supply are determined by changes in the size of the potential labor force, and by
changes in participation rates. Due to the region’s demographic transition, the new generations
entering working age have become smaller, and consequently the growth rate of the working age
population also slowed down in the 1990s. With respect to participation, we showed that for LatinFIGURE 11
Rate of growth of working age population between 1980s and 1990s
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America as a whole the rise in participation rates is also slowing down. The net effect is that for the
first time since the mid 1960s, the growth rate of the labor force is declining.
Although this pattern applies to most of the countries in the region, some differences remain. Figure
11 classifies countries according to changes in the working age population and the labor force
participation rate between the 1980s and 1990s. In 10 out of the 16 countries in our sample, the
growth rate both of the working age population and of participation rates decelerated; consequently,
they experienced net reductions in the rate of labor supply growth (See Quadrant D). In two
countries, (Bolivia and Uruguay) the pace of labor supply growth declined, in spite of an increase in
the rate of growth of the working age population in the 1990s (see quadrant B). The net decline in
labor supply growth was the result of a deceleration in the participation rate.
In 3 of the 16 countries, the growth rate of the working age population declined at the same time that
participation rates continued to rise (See Quadrant C).  In one of these, the Dominican Republic, the
net effect was a decline in the growth rate of labor supply.  However, in Mexico and Peru -- which
are 2 of only 3 three countries -- the growth rate of labor supply increased.  In these 2 countries,It may seem surprising that the working age population grew faster in the 1990s in Argentina and
28
Uruguay, which are relatively “old” countries. In the next section we clarify this issue.
29
increases in the growth rate of participation outweighed the effect of reductions in the rate of growth
of the working age population. Finally, Argentina is the only country where the growth of labor
supply accelerated both because of an acceleration in the growth of the working age population and
participation rates (See Quadrant A).
28
By itself, a decline in the pace of labor supply growth will not reduce employment or unemployment
since labor demand also plays a role.  Nevertheless, labor supply is an important factor in the labor
market.  If there were no changes in demand, declines in the rate of labor supply growth, like those
experienced by most of the countries described above, will reduce employment. As long as
unemployment does not change dramatically over time in a given country, the rate of employment
growth in the long run must correspond to the rate of growth of labor supply. 
Since the rate of labor supply growth has been declining in most of the countries in the region, we
would expect that the rate of employment growth would also decline. Figure 12 verifies this argument
with data from these 16 Latin American countries. The figure plots the change in the rate of labor
supply growth between the 1980s and 1990s, and the change in employment growth. There is a clear
positive relationship.  In the 1990s, employment growth accelerated in those countries where the pace
of labor supply growth increased, while employment grew at a slower pace in the countries where
labor supply growth decelerated.
In sum, trends in demographics and schooling play an important role in determining changes in
employment growth through their effect on labor supply.  If the rate of growth of the working age
population continues to decline in future years, as suggested by Figure 1, and if female participation
rates continue to increase at a slower pace due to changes in the age structure of the population, we
would expect that the labor force growth rate will decline in most countries over the next few
decades.  In addition, if unemployment rates remain fairly constant in the future, the rate of
employment growth will stabilize at a lower level in most of the countries in the region at the start






























































































































Change in Growth of Employment and
Labor Supply Between 1980s and 1990s
Source: Authors' calculations from UN (1997), ILO
(1997) and household surveys.
Figure 12
30
III. Demographics and Schooling Affect Unemployment
Demographic trends and changes in schooling affect not only employment growth, but also
unemployment rates.  This is because people of different ages and educational attainment have
different probabilities of finding and staying in jobs.  In particular, younger individuals take longer to
find jobs when they are unemployed and also are more likely to move from job to job.  This is partly
a consequence of taking time to find the “right” job (in terms of a match between the job’s
characteristics and the individual’s skills and preferences) as well as more limited information about
the individual because of their more limited experience.  By contrast, older workers have generally
established long-term relationships with employers, and have greater experience to judge the fit
between their current job and their best alternatives.  Employers are less likely to fire these older
workers because they may have specific skills and experience that are valuable, or because their
longer tenure raises severance payments. Similar arguments can be made about how rates of
unemployment vary between men and women.  Thus, demographic factors will affect the aggregateTABLE 6
OPEN UNEMPLOYMENT RATES BY SEX AND AGE
IN URBAN AREAS, 1994.
Country Gender Age Group Young/Elderly
Total 15-24 25-34 35-44 45 and over ratio
Argentina Total 13.0 22.8 10.0 10.5 10.3 2.2
Male 11.5 20.3 8.8 7.3 10.5 1.9
Female 15.5 26.7 11.9 15.4 10.0 2.7
Bolivia Total 3.2 5.8 2.8 2.0 2.1 2.8
Male 3.4 6.3 2.5 2.1 2.9 2.2
Female 2.9 5.2 3.2 1.9 0.9 5.8
Brazil Total 7.4 14.3 6.9 4.3 2.6 5.5
Male 6.4 12.4 5.5 3.8 2.7 4.6
Female 8.9 17.0 8.8 5.0 2.5 6.8
Colombia Total 8.0 16.2 7.6 4.7 3.3 4.9
Male 5.4 11.9 4.4 3.4 2.9 4.1
Female 11.6 21.0 11.6 6.3 4.2 5.0
Costa Rica Total 4.2 9.7 3.8 2.3 1.6 6.1
Male 3.7 8.6 3.7 1.5 1.6 5.4
Female 5.1 11.6 4.0 3.5 1.5 7.7
Chile Total 6.8 16.1 6.5 3.7 3.7 4.4
Male 5.9 14.0 5.5 3.0 3.9 3.6
Female 8.4 19.3 8.4 4.9 3.4 5.7
Honduras Total 4.1 7.1 3.6 3.1 1.3 5.5
Male 4.5 7.5 3.7 4.1 2.0 3.8
Female 3.4 6.6 3.6 1.3 0.1 66.0
Mexico Total 4.5 9.4 2.9 2.3 3.1 3.0
Male 5.1 10.0 3.0 2.8 4.2 2.4
Female 3.6 8.3 2.7 1.2 0.4 20.8
Panama Total 15.7 31.0 15.1 9.7 5.9 5.3
Male 12.4 27.5 9.7 6.8 5.7 4.8
Female 21.0 36.9 22.7 14.0 6.2 6.0
Paraguay Total 4.4 8.3 3.2 2.9 2.6 3.2
Male 5.1 9.9 3.4 3.1 3.9 2.5
Female 3.5 6.5 3.0 2.6 0.7 9.3
Uruguay Total 9.7 24.7 8.4 5.5 3.8 6.5
Male 7.3 19.8 4.9 3.4 3.4 5.8
Female 13.0 31.5 12.8 7.8 4.5 7.0
Venezuela Total 8.9 17.1 9.1 5.3 4.2 4.1
Male 9.1 17.2 8.8 5.9 4.9 3.5
Female 8.3 17.0 9.6 4.2 2.5 6.8
Note:   (1) The surveys for Argentina include only Gran Buenos Aires.
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Changes in Unemployment and in Age
Structure Between 1990 and 1996 Figure 13
This is the relative weight of the group with respect to the whole working age population.
29
32
The differences in unemployment rates by age and gender are shown in Table 6 for several countries,
and confirm that these rates are unequivocally higher for younger individuals in Latin America.  The
differences are particularly striking when we compare the unemployment rates among 15-24 year olds
to the rates registered by individuals older than 45.  For these 12 countries, unemployment is four
times higher on average among the younger groups  than among the older groups.
Clearly, an increase the share of the working age population among the young will increase the
number of individuals who are in a relatively volatile employment phase. If the 15-24 age group
increases as a share of the labor force, the number of young individuals entering the labor market for
the first time or searching for new jobs will increase, and aggregate unemployment will tend to be
higher. A simple plot of the change in the relative weight of the 15-24 age group versus the change
in unemployment during the 1990s for a set of countries confirms this relationship (See Figure 13).
29
In line with our argument, we find that there is a positive relation between the change in the relative
































































Share of the 15-24 Age Group










Two of the Latin American countries which have faced the largest increases in unemployment over
the past decade, Argentina and Uruguay,  are precisely those countries in which the share of the
young entering the labor force increased the most. At first sight, this seems to contradict the earlier
discussion which showed that these countries  are among the “oldest” countries in the region. In fact,
Argentina and Uruguay do have a much smaller share of 15-24 year olds in their population than
other Latin American countries (See Figure 14).  However,  the population weight of this young age
group increased in both countries during the 1990s.  In Argentina, the share increased sharply from
around 37% to 41% in only five years; while in Colombia, Jamaica, and Brazil, the size of this young
group declined steadily through 1990s.  In the case of Argentina, the sudden rise in the population
share of the 15-24 group in the 1990s is a response to a sharp increase in fertility by almost 10% that
took place during the period 1967-1975. The fact that a “baby boom” during the late 1960s could
have implications for labor market outcomes twenty years later is a good example of the importance
of the supply-side story.In fact, in figure 9 we showed that one of the major differences between female participation in the
30
region and the pattern observed in industrial countries, is that Latin American females return to the market at
much lower rates.
The result is obtained as follows. First, we divide the labor force by age group and gender in 1990 and
31
obtain the distribution of the labor force in each cell (the groups are the same as in Table 6). Then we multiply the
unemployment rate of each group by its relative weight and obtain the total unemployment rate in 1990. We divide
the labor force in the same way with the 1996 data and obtain 1996 weights. Finally we apply the 1996 weights to
the unemployment rate by age and gender observed in 1990, and the result is the change in unemployment due to
changes in age and gender composition of the labor force.
Figures 11 and 14 show that Argentina and Uruguay are about the only two countries in which the
32
growth of the working age population accelerated in the 1990s due to the expansion of the 15-24 age group. In
both of these countries female participation rates increased in the 1990s, which means that women represented a
34
Unemployment rates among women are substantially different from men in ways that are tending to
aggravate unemployment in the region.  The differences in unemployment by age are much larger for
women than for men.  On average young men are 3.7 times more likely to be unemployment than the
oldest working age group; while young women are almost eight times more likely to be unemployed
than older women.  There are even cases like Mexico where women 15-24 years of age register
unemployment rates almost 20 times larger than women 45 and over. 
In addition to the factors related to age which are common to both sexes, the difference in
unemployment rates and age profiles for women are strongly affected by having children.  Women
typically enter the labor market when they are relatively young, but many of them exit (permanently
or temporarily) during childbearing years.  It may be more difficult for women to get jobs when
30
employers are less certain that they will remain with the firm; in some cases because it will not be as
worthwhile for employers to invest the same amount in training, while in other cases there may be
mandatory and costly maternity benefits. Women may also face discrimination in the labor market or
there may be reasons that it is more difficult for them to find a good match between their skills and
characteristics and the available jobs.  Regardless of the reason, the higher rate of unemployment
among younger women has tended to increase the unemployment rate of the region as a result of their
increasing labor force participation rates.  Therefore, the “natural” rate of unemployment has not only
changed because there are more or less young individuals searching for employment, but also because
an increasing proportion of those individuals are women.
By calculating how much unemployment would change only as a consequence of the changing
composition of the labor force, due to the growing share of young workers and of women, it is
possible to estimate the effect of these trends on the changes in unemployment during the 1990s (See
Table 7). The third column in the table contains the change in total unemployment actually observed
between 1990 and 1996, while in the fourth column we show how much unemployment would have
changed solely as a result of the trends in age structure and participation rates.  According to these
31
figures, unemployment in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay would have increased by 1.02, 0.18 and 0.38
points, respectively during the 1990s if  the only shifts taking place were changes in the age and
gender composition of the labor force.   Total unemployment did, in fact, increase in these three
32TABLE 7
EFFECT OF THE AGE STRUCTURE OF THE POPULATION
ON THE CHANGE IN UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE 1990s
Points due to (%) Change in
Country        Unemployment Change Changes in  Unemployment
               Rate in Unempl. Age Structure Due to Change
1990 1996 (Points) in Age Structure
Argentina 7.3 18.0 10.7 1.02 9.54
Bolivia 7.2 3.6 -3.6 -0.13 3.60
Brazil 4.3 6.1 1.8 0.18 9.79
Chile 7.4 6.6 -0.8 -0.41 51.53
Colombia 11.0 11.4 0.4 -0.36 -89.27
Costa Rica 4.6 5.2 0.6 -0.28 -47.29
Honduras 4.2 3.2 -1 -0.21 21.09
Mexico 2.7 5.6 2.9 -0.25 -8.77
Panama 16.3 13.7 -2.6 -0.88 34.03
Paraguay 6.6 5.6 -1 -0.10 10.37
Uruguay 9.3 12.8 3.5 0.38 10.86
Venezuela 9.9 11.1 1.2 -0.56 -47.02
Average 7.57 8.58 1.01
Source: Authors' calculations using data from UN (1997) and ECLAC (1997)
larger proportion of the labor force.
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countries; and around 10% of the increase in the unemployment rate can be accounted for by these
demographic changes in the “natural” rate of unemployment.
In all the other countries in the sample, however, the demographic changes have had a moderating
influence on the unemployment rate.  If the only changes taking place in the 1990s had been the shifts
in the age and gender composition of the labor force in these countries, then the unemployment rate
would actually have declined.  In the case of Chile, Panama, Honduras, Paraguay and Bolivia, total
unemployment did decline, and according to our estimates the reduction associated with the decline
in the “natural” rate of unemployment was 51%, 34%, 22%, 10.3% and 3.6%, respectively.
In the four remaining cases, total unemployment rose despite a decline in the natural rate of
unemployment.  In Mexico, unemployment would have actually fallen by 0.25 points instead of
increasing by 2.9 points as a result of the changing composition of the work force. In Colombia,
Costa Rica and Venezuela, the observed increases in unemployment were somewhat lower than they
would have been in the 1990s were it not for the decline in the “natural” rate. The differences
between the actual changes in unemployment and the expected impact of demographic trends wasTable 8
Expected Reduction in Unemployment
















Source: Authors' calculations using data 
from UN (1997) and ECLAC (1997)
We use population projections from UN (1997), and estimate the effects by using the 1996 structure of
33
the labor force in terms of gender and age, and the unemployment rate by category, to obtain the total
unemployment rate in 1996. To estimate the effect in 2010, we use the projected age structure and female
participation rates for that year to obtain the new weights, and recompute the unemployment figure with this data
and the 1996 age-gender specific rates. We proceed in the same way with the 2020 data.
36
due to the effects of demand and the institutional settings of these countries.
Since we have some idea about how the age structure of countries will change in the future, it is
possible to estimate the expected impact of the demographic transition on unemployment (See Table
8).   In 1996, the average unemployment rate in the region was 8.6%, and if the age structure of the
33
population changes as predicted, unemployment will be 2.2 and almost 3.0 points smaller by the year
2010 and 2020, respectively. The predicted effects are particularly large in Panama, Colombia, Brazil,
Venezuela, Chile and Mexico.
IV. The Effects of Demographics and Schooling on InequalityTABLE 9
SUPPLY-SIDE EFFECTS OF DEMOGRAPHICS AND SCHOOLING ON WAGE INEQUALITY
Direction of Pressure on Wage Inequality
Gini Gini Change in Change Change in  Change in
Wages Wages Wage Inequality in Age Dispersion Return (Price)
Country Period 1980s 1990s (points)  Structure of Schooling to High Skill
Brazil 81-95 53.7 55.6 1.9 + + +
Chile 87-94 40.2 40.6 0.4 + - -
Costa Rica 81-95 55.5 55.5 0.0 neutral + +
Honduras 89-96 -- -- -- - + +
Mexico 84-94 43.1 51.9 8.8 neutral + +
Venezuela 81-95 35.0 39.3 4.3 neutral - -
Argentina  (1) 80-96 38.8 42.4 3.6 + + +
Bolivia  (2) 86-95 49.3 56.2 6.9 - + +
Note:  (1)  The surveys for Argentina include only the Gran Buenos Aires area.
          (2)  The surveys for Bolivia include only urban areas.
Source: Authors' calculations.
The table refers to urban males in the 18-65 age group. We use this sample because these individuals
34
have particularly strong labor market attachment, and therefore changes in wages are less likely to reflect changes
in participation rates.
37
One of the main concerns of Latin Americans today is the limited access to highly remunerated jobs.
Despite higher growth and lower volatility in the 1990s, wage inequality increased in many countries
and household income inequality has not declined at the expected rate. Table 9 demonstrates that the
Gini index for  wage incomes increased or remained high in all seven of the countries for which we
have reliable data in two separate years.   According to the table, there have been sharp rises in wage
34
inequality in Mexico (where the Gini increased by 20%), Argentina, Bolivia and Venezuela. The
distribution of wages also deteriorated, although only slightly in Brazil, and remained stable in Chile



















over these trends in inequality focuses on the effects of the crises in the 1980s, stabilization programs
and institutional reforms, we will argue that demographic trends and changes in schooling can explain
a portion of the change in income inequality.  First, the ageing of the population increases aggregate
income inequality because the distribution of income within older cohorts is larger than withinThe best way to know if the argument is true would be to follow individuals differing only in the amount
35
of training and education received, for a large number of years, and then find out if in reality their income gap
varied as described. Unfortunately this kind of data is not available, so we use household survey data as an
alternative.
In these graphs we  plot incomes in absolute terms for presentation purposes, but we also performed the
36
same calculations for log wages to focus on  differences in growth rates, and the results lead us to similar
conclusions. All results were obtained by processing household survey micro data.
Behrman (1996) explains this.
37
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younger groups.  Second, the rising educational attainments of the new generations are leading to
higher variances of schooling. One of the reasons is that increasing the education of the young lead
to differences between generations, which in turn increases income inequality. Another reason is that
education differences within new generations are declining, but these reductions are not enough to
reduce the overall variance of schooling.  Finally, the slow pace of educational progress has limited
the supply of highly skilled individuals to the labor force at a time when demand for such workers is
rising; this exacerbates income inequality by driving a wider wedge between the wages of more skilled
and less skilled workers.
The Surprising Effect of Demographics on Inequality
Income inequality is higher among older individuals than among younger ones; therefore, as the
population ages and the share of older groups increase, aggregate income inequality will also rise.
Figure 15 shows how income differences vary with age and schooling levels in Brazil.   Similar
35
figures for Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Honduras, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela
are presented in figure A3.1 in Appendix III.  We find that in all these countries the income
36
differences between the young are relatively small, but the income gap widens as people grow older.
Those who invested in training and education in childhood and early adulthood will receive the
returns to their investment later in life, and since there are differences in education and training, the
income gap between those with and without education will widen over time.   By way of illustration,
37
consider two individuals who are both 25 years old, but one has no education and the other has
completed university.  At 25 years of age, the income difference will be relatively small (about four
to one in Latin America).  As time goes by, the individual with higher education will receive
substantial pay increases while the unskilled individual will not.  By the time these individuals are
more than 45 years of age, the highly educated individual will be earning, on average, about eight
times more than the uneducated person.
Figure 15




























































In other words, the inequalities within age-groups tend to expand with age. Deaton (1997) explains this
38
type of results  in more detail and provides some evidence for developing countries of other regions. Lam (1997)
has used data from Brazil and the United States and also reaches the conclusion that for individuals 24 and older, 
within age-group inequality increases through the life cycle. However, Lam (1997) and Behrman (1997) have
explained that when a country ages, there are other forces acting on the distribution. Specifically,  young
individuals tend to have lower incomes than older ones, and so if one starts from a situation where all the
population is concentrated in the young age group, but one individual grows older and receives higher income, the
inequality between the age groups will tend to rise. Generally, the between-group component of inequality will tend
to reduce when a country ages. The evidence summarized in Tables 16 and 17, and in Appendix III suggest that in
Latin America as a whole, the within group component of inequality - which increases with age - has dominated.
39
Thus, if the income gaps maintain this same general pattern, income distribution will deteriorate as
countries age. For example, consider how low income inequality would be in Brazil if the entire
population was concentrated in the 20-25 age group by looking at Figure 15.  If, however, the entire
population were concentrated in the 40-50 age groups, income inequality would be much higher
because of the wider income difference  between highly and poorly educated individuals.  In other
words, as a country ages, income inequality tends to rise because people with higher education will
have had a chance of benefitting from the returns to their human capital.  After retirement age the
38




























































































































Effects of the Age Composition of the

































































































































































Impact of the Demographic Transition




Since Latin America is going through a stage of the demographic transition where several countries
are starting to age, the inequality-increasing effect of the transition may have been present in the
region for some time. To check if demographics impact inequality in the way we have argued, we
estimated an econometric model where changes in inequality are explained by macroeconomic
variables, education, and demographics. The regression results and the discussion of the
methodological issues involved in the estimation are presented in Appendix III.
Figures 16 and 17 summarize our findings and assess the quantitative significance of our results. The
first figure shows the independent contribution of each age group on total income inequality in Latin
America. The results suggest that the 15-24 age group has had an equalizing effect, presumably
because the income gap is smaller among the young, while the other age groups exacerbate inequality
because, as the population ages, the income gap widens. The figure also shows that the net
demographic effect (calculated by adding up the positive and negative contributions of each age
group) was neutral during the 1970s and 1980s. However, in the 1990s the population was already
ageing at a faster rate, and this contributed to a rise of three points in the Gini index.
Since Latin America comprises countries at different stages of the demographic transition, we
distinguished them in the same way as before (Figures 4a to 4d) and applied the regression results to
the age structure of the population of each country group. Figure 17 presents these results and shows
that demographic factors have reduced inequality in the “youngest” countries (those that are going
through stage II) precisely due to the high concentration of individuals at younger ages.  During the
1980s these demographic forces reduced the Gini coefficient by 3.4 points and in the 1990s the effect
was still negative but of a smaller magnitude. In the middle-aged countries in stage IIIa, the
demographic factors tended to reduce inequality in the 1970s and 1980s, but as larger proportions
of the population entered older age brackets in the 1990s, the demographic changes tended to
increase overall inequality -- accounting for about 1 additional point of the Gini index. Countries in
stages IIIb and IV, in which older cohorts have become more important, experienced demographic
effects which have exacerbated income inequality consistently since the 1970s, and the impact has
been particularly large in the 1990s. In the “oldest” countries in the region, the fact that larger
proportions of the population are concentrated in older ages, accounts for a full 5 points of the Gini
index.  The fourth column in Table 9 shows the sign of the demographic effect in eight countries.
There is only one case (Bolivia) where wage inequality increased despite the inequality-reducing
effects of demographic trends in that country.  In the 3 countries where demographic trends are
contributing to greater income inequality (Argentina, Brazil, and Chile), income distribution did in
fact worsen.
Changes in the Relative Supply of Education and Increases in Wage Inequality
Changes in schooling experienced by Latin American countries have also contributed to changes in
income inequality in two different ways.  First, the variance of schooling has increased in many  As previously discussed mean adjusted measures of schooling inequality fell for all countries in Table 4
39
as detailed in  Duryea and Szekely 1998.  We focus on the variance of schooling since in  a simple Mincerian
earnings function the variance of wages  is a function of the variance of schooling. 
  Duryea, 1997 decomposes the changes in wage inequality for Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela into the
40
contribution from a) changes in observed skill (schooling and experience), b)  changes in the returns to
characteristics (price changes) and c)  changes in returns to unobserved skill.  The full decomposition is based on
in Juhn, et.al. (1993).  The results are consistent with the changes in the distribution of schooling.  In Venezuela
the decline in schooling inequality contributed to a decline in wage inequality.  In Brazil and Mexico the change in
the distribution of education has worked to increase wage inequality, and apparently this has been an important
determinant of the deterioration in the wage distribution. 
  The returns to schooling are calculated from a regression of log wages on schooling and labor market
41
experience.  See Duryea 1997 for details.
42
countries which has led  to higher income inequality.   Second, the pace of educational progress has
39
not matched the rate at which demand for highly skilled individuals has increased.  As a result, the
wages of highly educated individuals are rising relative to the less educated, further exacerbating
income inequality.  The direction of the first effect is shown for 8 countries in Table 9.  In 6 of them,
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, Honduras, and Mexico, changes in the dispersion of schooling
have contributed to rising wage inequality.  In all of these except Costa Rica, wage inequality has in
fact increased. Chile, however, has advanced to a stage in which the variance of schooling for the
stock of workers is falling over time, and the result has been downward pressure on income
inequality.  
40
The second effect, resulting from changes in the relative earnings of highly educated workers, has
tended to reinforce the changes in educational disparities.  In all of the countries included in Table
9, the proportion of the adult population with secondary or higher schooling increased.  If the relative
demand for  different skills had remained the same in the 1990s as in the 1980s, these supply increases
should have been associated with a relative decline in the earnings of the more educated. However,
in all of these countries returns to higher levels of schooling increased, except for Venezuela and
Chile.   In other words, the wage premium associated with completing a year of post-secondary
41
schooling increased at the same time that the relative supply of individuals with higher schooling
increased.  This implies that the growing supply of educated individuals was not sufficient to keep
pace with the increasing demand for these highly skilled workers in most countries.
As discussed in Section I, increases in the variance of the stock of education in many countries does
not necessarily mean that recent education policies have failed. In fact relative schooling inequality
has fallen for both the stock of adults and among the flow of new potential workers for all countries
included in Table 4 and Figure A.2.  Unfortunately the process of advancing the distribution from a
low bound to an upper bound implies initial increases in the variance of the stock which implies initial
increases in wage inequality. 
The net impact of changes in the age structure of the population, the dispersion of schooling and
shifts in the relative supply of skills on wage inequality have varied across countries (See Table 9).43
In Argentina and Brazil, the Gini index for wages rose by 3.6 and 1.9 points, respectively. In these
cases, the changes in the age structure, the increase in educational disparities, and the rise in the wage
premium for higher education all contributed to exacerbate inequality.  In Mexico and Bolivia, wage
inequality increased by 8.8 and 6.9 Gini points, respectively (the largest shifts registered). In these
two countries, changes in the age structure of the population were neutral or inequality-reducing, but
schooling disparities widened in both countries and the premium to higher education increased.
Therefore, part of the shift could be accounted for by these last two supply-side effects; while in
Bolivia changes in the age composition of the population offset some of this increasing inequality.
In Costa Rica there was no change in wage inequality in spite of greater education differences and
higher premiums for the highest skills.
Chile and Venezuela experienced an opposite pattern of demographic and schooling effects. Changes
in the age structure of the population contributed to raising wage inequality or were neutral, while
education differences and the wage premium for the highest skills tended to reduce inequality.  Partly
as a consequence of the schooling effects, the Chilean Gini index increased marginally despite the
inequality-reducing effect of changes in its age structure.  Venezuela’s Gini index rose by 4.3 points
despite a neutral age composition effect and the presence of  inequality-reducing schooling factors.
V. Conclusions
Employment growth, unemployment rates, and wage inequality have definitely been affected by
supply factors in Latin America. Changes in demographics and education improve our understanding
on the overall decline in employment, the changing pattern of unemployment, and the rise in wage
inequality. By adding them to the demand and institutional factors we obtain a clearer picture about
labor markets in Latin America.
What about the future? For some time now, the Latin American region has been “investing” in its
young because approximately 40% of its population was of school-age, a group that is normally
supported by other household members who are of working-age. However, during the first decades
of the next century the share of individuals aged 19 years or more will increase, and so total
dependency rates  will fall. The population weight of the elderly (defined as individuals 65 and older)
—  who are not economically active -- is also increasing, so eventually the share of “dependents” in
the population will grow again. 
Figure 18 presents the evolution of the total dependency rate in the region, and shows that Latin
America is entering a “window of opportunity” during which the share of the working age population
will be growing relative to the share of dependents, whether young or old.  This “window” represents
an opportunity because when a higher proportion of household members are in working age, more
investment per child and greater savings for retirement can be made. However, this window will begin
to close as the population ages.  The  total dependency rate will rise again to its current level by





























































































The Demographic Window of Opportunity
In Latin America
Source: Author's calculations from UN
(1997). The dependency ratios are
adjusted for the cost differencial of








Calculations from the population data and projections in UN (1997). The dependency ratios give
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different weights to the elderly (aged 65 or more) and to children (aged 0-19), because it is relatively more
expensive to finance the cost of supporting the elderly (i.e. due to high medical costs), than the investment needed
to support a child. To calculate the relative weights, we estimated the amount of public resources that are spent on
the population over 65 years of age, and under 20 years of age, respectively. Specifically we compared public
expenditures per capita in education and public expenditures per capita in social security for the elderly, obtained
from Inter-American Development Bank (1996). The result was that one elderly person absorbs, on average, 4
times more public resources than children.
44
will last on average for the following 40 years.  Figure 19 plots the year in which the “window” will
42



































Last Year of Demographic Window of
Opportunity in LAC
Figure 21
Source: Calculations from UN (1997)
45
According to these estimates, the “window” will close soonest for Trinidad & Tobago, around the
year 2012, while it will remain open for Guatemala, Paraguay and Haiti until after 2050. The share
of the elderly is increasing very fast in several countries relative to the working age population, and
this will require a faster accumulation of private or public resources in the near future to provide for
retirement and medical expenditures. Pressure on pension systems, social security programs, and
families who support elderly members will be felt strongly within the next 15 years in Trinidad and
Tobago, Cuba, The Bahamas, Uruguay, Brazil and Barbados; and within the next 20 years in Chile,
Colombia, Argentina, Costa Rica and Jamaica. The question is: what is the best way to make
provisions for this event?
Currently, the share of  retirees is still not large, so one option is to seize the opportunity for initiating
social security reform. Such reforms have already taken place in seven Latin American countries
(Chile, Argentina, Peru, Colombia, Uruguay, Mexico and Bolivia). Lessons from the region and from
OECD countries show that it is more difficult to solve this problem when the elderly have already
become a relatively large group of the population. The demographic “window of opportunity”
provides Latin American countries with a chance to generate large net savings while moving to fully
funded systems before serious problems arise.
The “window of opportunity” is also highly relevant for education because it provides an excellentFor a comparison of Latin America and other regions of the world in terms of tax effort, demographic
43
effects, and education, see Inter-American Development Bank (1996: p. 250).
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chance for improving the quality of schooling. Until recently, most countries were in an early stage
of the demographic transition and the share of the 0-15 age-group was increasing rapidly.  This put
pressure on the demand for education services which had to respond through massive expansions.
Since providing education has large fixed costs such as infrastructure and training a corps of skilled
teachers, countries have had difficulty investing enough to catch up with the demand generated by
the demographic trends. However, as the population share of school-age children begins to decline,
simply maintaining the same tax contribution per worker and the level of overall educational spending
represents more resources per student.  If more resources per child can be translated into better
43
schooling quality, there is a significant opportunity to improve the quality of education in the region.Table  A1.1   DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA
Country Year Name of the survey Coverage Reference
Month Households Individuals
1 Argentina 80 Encuesta Permanente de Hogares Gran Buenos Aires October 3,400              11,905        
96 Encuesta Permanente de Hogares Gran Buenos Aires April and May 3,459              11,749        
2 Bolivia 86 Encuesta Permanente de Hogares Urban 1986 2,788              12,226        
95 Encuesta Integrada de Hogares Urban June 5,455              25,314        
3 Brazil 81 Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios National September 103,961          482,611      
95 Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios National September 85,270            334,263      
4 Chile 87 Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional National November  22,700            97,044        
94 Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional National November and December 45,379            178,057      
5 Colombia 95 Encuesta Nacional de Hogares - Fuerza de Trabajo National September 18,255            79,012        
6 Costa Rica 81 Encuesta Nacional de Hogares - Empleo y Desempleo National July 6,604              22,170        
95 Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples National July 9,639              40,613        
7 Ecuador 95 Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida National August to November 5,810              26,941        
8 El Salvador 95 Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples National 1995 8,482              40,004        
9 Honduras 89 Encuesta Permanente de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples National September 8,727              46,672        
96 Encuesta Permanente de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples National September 6,428              33,172        
10 Mexico 84 Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso Gasto de los Hogares National Third quarter 4,735              23,985        
94 Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso Gasto de los Hogares National Third quarter 12,815            60,365        
11 Nicaragua 93 Encuesta Nacional de Hogares Sobre Medicion de Niveles de VidaNational February to June 4,458              24,542        
12 Panama 95 Encuesta Continua de Hogares  National August 9,875              40,320        
13 Paraguay 95 Encuesta de Hogares - Mano de Obra National August to November 4,667              21,910        
14 Peru 85-86 Encuesta Nacional de Hogares sobre Medición de Niveles de VidaNational July 1985 to July 1986 4,913              26,323        
96 Encuesta Nacional de Hogares sobre Niveles de Vida y Pobreza National Fourth quarter 16,744            88,863        
15 Uruguay 81 Encuesta Nacional de Hogares  Urban Second semester 9,506 32,610
95 Encuesta Continua de Hogares  Urban 1995 20,057 64,930
16 Venezuela 81 Encuesta de Hogares por Muestra National Second semester 45,421            239,649      
95 Encuesta de Hogares por Muestreo National Second semester 16,784            92,450        
a. Can not separate between property and capital rent.
b. Can not separate between property rent, capital rent, and transfers.
Sample size
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APPENDIX ITable A1.2.a Average years of schooling 25-65 year olds
Argentina Bolivia Brasil ColombiaCosta Rica Chile Ecuador El SalvadorHonduras Mexico Panama Paraguay Peru Uruguay Venezuela Average
Decile 1996 1995 1995 1995 1995 1994 1995 1995 1996 1994 1995 1995 1996 1995 1995
I 7.10 6.44 2.41 4.86 4.51 6.31 3.92 2.01 2.76 3.08 4.61 3.62 5.85 6.30 5.85 4.64
II 7.70 7.31 3.02 5.62 5.01 7.16 4.77 2.40 2.95 3.52 5.77 3.80 6.31 6.83 6.31 5.23
III 7.84 7.73 3.38 5.93 5.61 7.64 5.39 2.78 3.25 4.39 6.84 4.33 6.47 7.22 6.60 5.69
IV 8.28 8.15 3.82 6.37 6.01 8.02 5.67 3.17 3.71 5.43 7.55 4.93 6.19 7.49 6.86 6.11
V 8.84 8.14 4.32 6.63 6.33 8.45 6.63 3.53 4.21 5.93 8.09 5.15 6.29 7.81 6.76 6.47
VI 9.39 8.58 4.84 6.96 6.67 8.91 7.36 4.10 4.46 6.23 8.84 5.69 6.83 8.28 7.32 6.96
VII 9.65 9.20 5.68 7.18 7.37 9.43 8.10 5.20 4.88 7.31 9.45 6.67 7.40 8.99 7.17 7.58
VIII 10.28 9.61 6.37 7.73 7.83 10.30 8.37 6.19 5.92 7.83 10.20 7.35 8.27 9.53 7.72 8.23
IX 11.73 10.83 7.50 7.75 9.01 11.30 9.44 7.58 6.74 8.66 11.50 8.19 9.06 10.64 8.21 9.21
X 14.24 12.12 10.33 6.68 11.85 13.12 11.76 11.02 8.98 11.24 13.93 10.75 10.84 12.68 9.93 11.30
Source: Author's calculations from household survey data.
Table A1.2.b Average years of schooling 12 year olds
Argentina Bolivia Brasil ColombiaCosta Rica Chile Ecuador El SalvadorHonduras Mexico Panama Paraguay Peru Uruguay Venezuela Average
Decile 1996 1995 1995 1995 1995 1994 1995 1995 1996 1994 1995 1995 1996 1995 1995
I 4.10 4.96 1.89 4.16 4.03 5.63 4.56 2.65 3.35 4.01 4.73 3.39 3.46 5.04 4.76 4.05
II 3.50 5.36 2.30 4.49 4.18 5.78 4.43 3.11 3.21 4.03 4.98 3.75 3.52 5.65 5.09 4.22
III 3.91 5.39 2.61 4.57 4.07 5.86 4.89 3.14 3.23 4.37 5.13 3.69 3.35 5.50 5.14 4.32
IV 5.05 5.69 2.94 4.86 4.62 6.07 4.93 3.10 3.80 4.34 5.31 4.28 3.21 5.83 5.23 4.62
V 4.60 5.40 3.31 4.45 4.43 6.03 5.48 3.28 3.78 4.64 5.60 3.78 3.45 5.77 5.20 4.61
VI 3.50 5.33 3.67 4.61 4.65 6.16 5.40 3.85 3.73 4.86 5.47 4.21 3.68 5.82 4.92 4.66
VII 4.28 5.40 3.91 4.53 4.99 6.05 5.47 3.86 3.81 4.72 5.67 4.59 3.96 5.59 5.24 4.80
VIII 4.84 5.62 4.12 3.79 4.76 6.28 5.58 4.19 4.41 5.25 5.60 4.45 4.42 6.04 5.17 4.97
IX 4.34 5.50 4.44 4.06 5.25 6.19 5.47 4.27 4.14 4.85 5.75 4.76 4.54 5.41 5.55 4.97
X 3.50 5.92 4.74 4.23 5.10 6.12 5.53 4.81 4.85 5.06 6.03 4.69 4.11 5.72 5.80 5.08
Source: Author's calculations from household survey data.
Table A1.2.c  Average years of schooling 15 year olds
Argentina Bolivia Brasil ColombiaCosta Rica Chile Ecuador El SalvadorHonduras Mexico Panama Paraguay Peru Uruguay Venezuela Average
Decile 1996 1995 1995 1995 1995 1994 1995 1995 1996 1994 1995 1995 1996 1995 1995
I 7.78 7.53 3.14 6.17 5.97 7.88 5.85 4.19 4.63 6.04 6.12 5.07 6.69 7.31 6.63 6.07
II 8.37 8.02 3.65 6.63 6.17 8.16 6.15 4.76 4.09 6.49 6.79 5.39 6.55 8.05 7.09 6.42
III 9.01 8.11 4.04 6.64 6.56 8.64 7.10 4.41 4.92 6.72 7.35 6.21 6.74 8.24 7.15 6.79
IV 9.23 8.11 4.40 6.63 6.70 8.50 6.94 4.67 4.70 6.81 7.41 5.83 7.10 8.57 7.09 6.85
V 9.44 8.22 4.92 6.83 6.38 8.57 7.06 5.08 5.18 7.33 7.87 6.15 6.50 8.41 7.10 7.00
VI 9.55 7.72 5.23 6.93 6.71 9.23 7.88 5.35 4.84 7.81 7.65 6.37 6.45 8.82 7.12 7.18
VII 9.27 8.27 5.88 6.79 6.74 8.66 7.39 5.75 5.64 7.64 8.04 5.97 7.06 8.35 7.56 7.27
VIII 9.29 8.10 6.10 5.94 7.49 8.99 7.20 6.42 6.04 7.85 8.33 6.95 7.35 8.55 7.00 7.44
IX 9.50 8.20 6.62 5.68 7.34 8.51 7.44 6.99 6.47 9.03 8.37 6.98 7.82 8.81 7.42 7.68
X 9.50 8.13 7.09 5.86 7.52 9.31 8.07 7.91 6.71 8.32 8.50 7.02 7.75 9.00 8.29 7.93
Source: Author's calculations from household survey data.
48Table A1.2.d Average years of schooling 18 year olds
Argentina Bolivia Brasil ColombiaCosta Rica Chile Ecuador El SalvadorHonduras Mexico Panama Paraguay Peru Uruguay Venezuela Average
Decile 1996 1995 1995 1995 1995 1994 1995 1995 1996 1994 1995 1995 1996 1995 1995
I 8.84 10.42 3.70 7.78 6.60 8.90 6.67 4.60 5.33 6.08 6.83 5.81 8.57 8.55 7.58 7.08
II 8.85 10.20 4.33 7.80 7.14 9.49 7.46 5.44 4.80 6.65 7.29 5.81 8.58 8.99 7.96 7.39
III 9.59 10.29 4.96 8.23 6.63 9.47 7.37 5.65 5.19 7.68 7.55 5.44 8.50 9.26 8.27 7.61
IV 9.59 10.33 5.22 7.91 7.24 9.40 7.92 5.67 5.22 7.95 9.03 6.02 7.79 9.36 8.28 7.79
V 10.23 10.15 5.79 8.08 6.69 10.04 8.22 6.06 5.64 9.06 9.69 7.90 8.25 9.86 8.49 8.28
VI 10.12 10.28 6.21 8.31 7.84 9.71 8.46 6.04 5.98 9.10 9.66 8.19 9.12 9.95 8.00 8.46
VII 11.60 10.16 6.84 8.30 8.29 10.20 8.50 7.09 6.50 9.03 10.01 8.00 9.18 9.87 8.02 8.77
VIII 12.01 10.38 6.93 7.16 7.74 10.84 10.09 8.00 6.31 9.95 10.26 8.24 9.89 10.58 8.67 9.14
IX 12.71 10.04 8.45 7.30 8.88 11.35 9.34 8.18 6.61 9.22 11.01 8.40 9.98 10.55 8.65 9.38
X 14.14 10.87 9.29 6.64 10.18 11.23 10.38 9.61 7.38 10.89 11.59 9.86 10.24 11.12 9.65 10.20
Source: Author's calculations from household survey data.
Table A1.2.e Average years of schooling 21 year olds
Argentina Bolivia Brasil ColombiaCosta Rica Chile Ecuador El SalvadorHonduras Mexico Panama Paraguay Peru Uruguay Venezuela Average
Decile 1996 1995 1995 1995 1995 1994 1995 1995 1996 1994 1995 1995 1996 1995 1995
I 6.41 10.94 4.13 7.19 5.70 9.03 7.99 5.73 4.81 6.01 6.16 4.23 9.00 7.50 7.35 6.81
II 8.68 11.15 4.29 7.62 6.35 9.75 7.85 4.72 4.82 6.99 7.92 4.88 9.53 8.86 8.28 7.45
III 9.84 10.97 4.87 8.62 6.61 9.67 8.23 4.86 4.45 7.76 8.54 4.83 8.45 9.05 8.57 7.69
IV 9.58 11.43 5.42 8.98 6.37 10.24 8.88 5.91 5.05 9.01 9.36 6.55 9.29 9.67 8.64 8.29
V 10.90 10.64 5.68 8.97 7.41 10.75 8.81 6.85 5.52 8.89 9.45 5.56 9.13 10.08 8.41 8.47
VI 11.43 11.44 6.80 8.78 7.58 11.61 9.17 6.91 5.77 9.18 10.37 6.63 9.30 10.42 8.37 8.92
VII 12.13 11.58 7.35 8.89 7.65 11.67 10.58 7.64 7.00 10.29 10.68 8.40 8.96 10.50 9.39 9.51
VIII 12.83 10.96 7.83 9.22 8.84 12.07 10.10 8.73 6.98 9.18 11.06 8.40 9.98 11.18 8.81 9.75
IX 13.11 11.66 8.79 8.68 10.12 12.51 10.03 9.35 8.45 9.92 11.48 9.43 11.16 11.62 9.20 10.37
X 14.04 12.64 10.63 7.89 11.29 13.48 11.10 11.82 9.04 11.32 12.38 10.91 11.08 12.14 10.20 11.33
Source: Author's calculations from household survey data.
Table A1.2.f Average years of schooling 24 year olds
Argentina Bolivia Brasil ColombiaCosta Rica Chile Ecuador El SalvadorHonduras Mexico Panama Paraguay Peru Uruguay Venezuela Average
Decile 1996 1995 1995 1995 1995 1994 1995 1995 1996 1994 1995 1995 1996 1995 1995
I 6.60 9.99 3.95 6.48 5.24 8.36 6.15 3.39 4.72 5.54 6.26 4.50 8.18 7.15 7.20 6.25
II 8.21 10.15 4.18 6.92 5.87 8.93 6.76 4.48 4.53 5.82 7.84 6.27 8.54 8.14 8.07 6.98
III 9.77 9.70 4.73 8.04 6.21 9.42 7.95 5.40 4.95 7.33 7.71 5.87 9.33 8.86 8.66 7.60
IV 9.17 10.53 5.47 7.95 6.45 10.21 7.45 4.73 4.68 8.28 8.79 5.22 8.94 9.38 7.98 7.68
V 9.34 10.23 5.99 8.42 6.71 10.25 9.30 5.78 5.42 8.41 9.32 7.27 8.41 10.64 8.39 8.26
VI 10.36 10.08 6.76 8.15 7.10 11.02 8.60 6.32 4.79 8.77 10.36 6.65 8.73 10.94 7.65 8.42
VII 10.82 11.11 7.16 9.38 7.79 11.37 9.36 7.51 6.49 10.78 10.64 7.68 9.71 11.02 9.54 9.36
VIII 11.90 11.91 8.32 8.87 8.71 12.16 9.61 8.76 6.74 9.83 11.46 8.35 10.22 11.46 8.41 9.78
IX 12.32 11.70 8.92 8.18 10.05 13.32 10.35 11.23 6.90 10.62 12.36 8.66 10.50 12.05 9.22 10.43
X 13.80 13.51 11.04 7.88 11.60 13.93 11.72 12.57 9.99 11.91 14.15 10.96 11.63 12.99 10.30 11.86
Source: Author's calculations from household survey data.


























Source: Duryea and Szekely, 1998.Variance of Schooling by Birth Cohort, Men
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Source: Duryea and Szekely, 1998.Enrollment Rates by Age
Country and Year 7 10 12 15 18 20 21
Brazil 1995 0.87 0.94 0.91 0.75 0.47 0.29 0.25
Chile 1994 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.85 0.52 0.24 0.24
Colombia 1995 0.91 0.95 0.90 0.71 0.46 0.30 0.25
Costa Rica 1995 0.97 0.98 0.94 0.64 0.39 0.31 0.25
Ecuador 1995 0.92 0.97 0.90 0.60 0.38 0.28 0.24
El Salvador 1995 0.79 0.88 0.86 0.63 0.35 0.23 0.22
Honduras 1996 0.81 0.92 0.83 0.43 0.25 0.16 0.13
Mexico 1994 0.95 0.96 0.91 0.61 0.33 0.22 0.24
Nicaragua 1993 0.66 0.86 0.79 0.54 0.35 0.23 0.17
Panama 1995 0.97 0.99 0.95 0.78 0.49 0.29 0.24
Paraguay 1995 0.89 0.97 0.93 0.55 0.36 0.19 0.15
Peru 1996 0.94 0.96 0.95 0.86 0.44 0.33 0.30
Venezuela 1995 0.96 0.97 0.95 0.78 0.45 0.34 0.27
Cross-country Average 0.90 0.95 0.91 0.67 0.40 0.26 0.23
Argentina 1996    (1) 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.73 0.52 0.34 0.42
Bolivia 1995    (2) 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.91 0.74 0.57 0.56
Uruguay 1995    (3) 1.00 0.99 0.97 0.78 0.46 0.33 0.28
Cross-country Average 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.81 0.57 0.41 0.42
Note:  (1)  The surveys for Argentina include only the Gran Buenos Aires area.
            (2)  The surveys for Bolivia and Uruguay include only urban areas.
Source:  Author's calculations.
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Appendix IV
Enrollment Rates by Age
Table A4.1FEMALE LABOR MARKET PARTICIPATION IN LAC
Independent Variable         Dependent Variable: Female Participation Rate*
-1 -2 -3 -4 (5) (6)
Method of Estimation fe fe fe fe be re
Income Variables
Average  Wages -0.001
(-1.2)
Average Wages in Manufacturing -0.001
(-2.3)
Minimum Wage -0.001 -0.001 0.00 0.00
(-3.4) (-1.3) (-0.3) (-1.7)
Fertility and Education
Fertility Rate -1.64 -0.67 -0.18
(-5.4) (-2.5) (-6.0)
Average Education of Female WAP 0.2 0.2 0.2
(3.5) (1.3) (2.9)
Constant -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.9 3.3 -2.6
(-2.0) (-2.3) (-2.6) (-2.3) (2.1) (-0.7)
R-squared 0.01 0.05 0.08 0.44 0.33 0.20
Number of Observations 154 127 156 145 20 145
* 't' Statistics in parenthesis
*Specifically, we used the following measure as dependent variable: ln(p/(1-p)), 
  where p denoes female labor market participation rate.





Supply-Side Analysis of Labor Market Participation
To examine changes in female participation, we estimate a model where changes in the supply of
labor are driven by demographics, education, and other control variables. All the data  used in the
estimations comes from a panel with information from 22 Latin American countries for the period
1970-1996. The data on participation was taken from two sources. For the period 1960-1992 we
used ILO (1997), and for Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Honduras,
Mexico, Peru and Venezuela we obtained female participation rates for years close to 1995,
directly from household surveys (see table A1.1 in Appendix I for details). Fertility indicators
were taken from UN (1997), while the information on female education is from Barro-Lee (1996).
Data on wages are from ILO (1997 and other years).
Table A2.1
Ta bleFEMALE LABOR MARKET PARTICIPATION AND EDUCATION
Independent Variable Dep. Variable: Female Participation Rate*
-1 -2 -3 -4
Method of Estimation fe fe fe fe
Minimum Wage 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00
(-1.0) (-2.0) (-2.0) (-1.1)
Fertility Rate -0.161 -0.216 -0.207 -0.156
(-5.2) (-7.8) (-7.1) (-5.4)
Education
(%) with no education -0.0269
(-3.4)
(%) with primary education -0.015
(-1.4)
(%) with secondary education 0.24
(1.2)
(%) with higher education 1.0
(4.7)
Constant 0.9 0.6 0.2 -2.9
(5.2) (3.7) (0.9) (-1.5)
R-squared 0.44 0.40 0.39 0.48
Number of Observations 145 145 145 145
* 't' Statistics in parenthesis
*Specifically, we used the following measure as dependent variable:
 ln(p/(1-p)), where p denoes female labor market participation rate.
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A.2.1 assesses the relation female labor market participation on the one hand, and fertility and
average years of schooling on the other, by controlling for income. In Table A.2.2 we run the base
regression by testing which type of education matters the most, and we find that the relation
between female education and participation is totally driven by higher schooling. In Table A.2.3
we include demographics into the base equation.
      Table A2.2
The use of these variables introduces a number of econometric problems. For instance the
regression coefficients could be simply capturing differences between countries, which result in
omitted variable bias. Additionally, we could have problems of endogeneity because fertility and
education are not totally exogenous to participation (in fact, the decision to participate or not
could be fully determined by the fact that an individual chooses to attend school or to enter a
child-bearing stage), and as we are dealing with a mix of cross sections and time series some
variables that appear to be correlated could simply be following common trends. Another issue is
that some of the variables included in the analysis can be following dynamic processes capturing
unobserved factors. FEMALE LABOR MARKET PARTICIPATION 
AND DEMOGRAPHICS
Independent Variable





(%) with higher education 0.001
(1.6)
Demographic Variables
(%) Population in Age 0-9 -0.003
(-2.17)
(%) Population in Age 10-19 0.004
(0.26)
(%) Population in Age 20-29 0.002
(1.7)
(%) Population in Age 30-39 0.07
(3.0)





Number of Observations 145
* 't' Statistics in parenthesis
*Specifically, we used the following measure as dependent variable:
 ln(p/(1-p)), where p denoes female labor market participation rate.
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     Table A2.3
In what follows we discuss how we addressed these important issues, but in sum, we used fixed
effects to tackle the problem of omitted variables, we used instrumental variables to account for
endogeneity, we estimated regressions both in levels and changes to correct for possibility that
some variables are non-stationary, and we also estimated regressions with lags to capture
dynamics. For presentation purposes we present the most intuitive results in the main text and
derive the decomposition in Figure 10 from these same results, but it should be stressed that when
one attempts to correct for these potential problems, the conclusions we do not vary.56
The basic model
This is a simple model that checks for the robustness of the results presented in the previous three
tables. The basic structure is as follows:
(1) WLPit = F (MLPit, AGEit, EDUCit, FERTit, MACROit)
Where:
WLP = Women’s labor force participation rate
MLP = Men’s labor force participation rate
AGE = Age structure of the population 
EDUC = Education of the female population
FERT = Fertility rate of the population 
MACRO = other macro economic control variables that indicate economic growth, openness,
financial depth, urban population rate, and composition of the economy between manufacturing
and services.
it = are subscript indices for country I in time t, respectively.
However we believe that decisions regarding fertility and labor force participation are made
jointly in most cases, in which case fertility becomes an endogenous variable. To address this
problem we build a supplementary model of fertility:
(2)      FERTit = F (AGEit, EDUCit, IMRit, MACROit)
Where IMR is the infant mortality rate.
In this case the infant mortality rate is chosen as an exogenous variable which we assume is
correlated with fertility decisions but not with labor force participation decisions (i.e. the
identifying instrumental variable).  Thus our final model is: 
(3) WLPit = F (MLPit, AGEit, EDUCit, FERTIVit, MACROit)
Where FERTIV is the instrumented fertility rate.
Data for estimating this model is available for at least some time periods from Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, The Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Haiti,
Jamaica, Mexico,  Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Paraguay, El Salvador, Uruguay and Venezuela.
Bolivia has been omitted from the analysis due to data outliers (see table A2.7 where Mexico has
also been omitted from the regression).  In general data was available on each country in the early
1960s, the early 1970s, the early 1980s and the early 1990s.  In addition many countries had data
available scattered throughout the 1980s and early 1990s in no particular pattern.  In order to
maximize the amount of information utilized while insuring that the periods of analysis were
comparable across countries data that was collected as close to 1960, 1970, 1980 and 1990 as57
possible and the average annual growth rate over the specific interval of time for each country
was calculated for each variable.  Thus the data correspond as closely a possible to the decades of
the sixties, the seventies and the eighties.
The variables used were chosen to correspond as closely as possible to the hypothesized factors
considered during the development of the basic model.  Women’s (men’s) labor force
participation rates were calculated at the ratio of economically active women (men) to total
female (male) population age 25 to 59.  Education variables measure the percentage of women
ages twenty-five and older that have completed primary, secondary and higher education levels,
respectively. This data was available every five years and was generated by linear interpolation
where necessary.  Total fertility rates and infant mortality rates were obtained from the World
Tables of the World Bank and UN (1997).  The age structure of the population was obtained
from the United Nations in the form of a cohort census.  General macroeconomic control
variables were taken from the Summers and Heston Penn World Tables  and the World Tables
and include per capital GDP growth, openness, and the percentage of population living in urban
areas.  Formally the variables used in the empirical analysis and their definitions are:
variable definition
FLP  Female labor force participation rate
MLP  Male labor force participation rate
FSP  percentage of females that have completed primary school
FSS   percentage of females that have completed secondary school
FSH  percentage of females that have completed higher schooling
COH1   population between 25 and 34 years of age
COH2  population between 35 and 40 years of age
COH3  population between 45 and 54 years of age
COH4  population between 55 and 59 years of age
TFR Total fertility rate (instrumented variable is FERTIV)
IMR Infant mortality rate
GGDP per capita GDP growth rate
OPEN openness = ratio of (exports + imports) to GDP
URBT percentage of population living in urban areas
FDEP measure of financial depth
MANUF percentage of output of manufacturing
Methodology
In order to empirically estimate the model there are several issues that must be considered.  The
first is that many of these variables: labor force participation, fertility rates, education etc. are
trending over time and may even be non stationary in nature in that they may not tend back to
some trend-mean. Thus they would  appear to be correlated even if variations in one really had no
impact on variations in the others.  The second issue is that these variables are also following58
dynamic processes: the increase in female participation, education and fertility in any given year
will depend on the past values of the levels of these variables and perhaps on the previous growth
rates. Empirically the dynamics will be even more important as they capture not only the intrinsic
dynamic evolution of the processes themselves but also many of the unobservable factors that are
influencing the variables.  Third, since our data set is a panel of countries we might also wish to
consider the possibility that the nature of the relationship between the variables of interest may
vary with certain country characteristics such as the levels and pace of cultural and economic
development and relevant initial conditions.  Of course there are other possibilities that could be
explored, such as whether the relationships in question may be non-linear in nature, whether the
processes within each country are truly independent as basic OLS requires, or whether there are
spillover effects and/or common shocks that play a role in determining women's participation
rates.  For the purposes of this analysis we shall focus only on the first three issues and leave these
other modeling issues for later.
A simple way to address the first problem is estimate the model in growth rates rather than in
levels. For example, if our proposed model is:
(4)      WLFPit = a + b1MLFPit + b2AGEit + b3EDUCit + b4FERTit +b5MACROit+uit
then it follows that
(5) WLFPit-1 = a + b1MLFPit-1 + b2AGEit-1 + b3EDUCit-1 + b4FERTit-1 +
        b5MACROit-1 +uit-1
If we take logs of both sides of each equation and subtract (5) from (4) we get:
(6) GWLFPit = b1GMLFPit+ b2GAGEit + b3GEDUCit + b4GFERTit + 
                    b5GMACROit +eit
Where all our variables are now expressed in growth rates.  If we include an intercept this model
eliminates the influence of any common trend in the levels on the estimates of the coefficients and
also differences out the country-specific time-invariant characteristics that might influence the
relationships in question.  We also would like to test whether initial conditions have an impact by
including the initial level variables. Of course we still may have second-order country effects or
trends in the growth rates so will shall consider both the possibilities of country and time effects in
the estimation. Our final model with which we begin our analysis then becomes:
(7) GWLFPit = ai + tt + b1GMLFPit + b2GAGEit + b3GEDUCit + b4GFERTit +
        b5GMACROit +b6WLFP1960 + eit
Due to the small number of total observations (50) we are extremely parsimonious throughout the
analysis. A general-to-simple modeling strategy is adopted in which control variables are
systematically excluded from the model if statistical tests indicate that the variable's effect isTABLE A2.4
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: GTFR
Variable Parameter est. t-statistic Prob > |T|
INTERCEPT -0.0004 0.0780 0.9383
CDUM5 -0.0234 -2.8390 0.0072
CDUM7 -0.0191 -2.6030 0.0130
CDUM9 -0.0106 -1.3120 0.1972
CDUM15 -0.0092 -1.2650 0.2136
CDUM18 -0.0087 -1.2870 0.2056
GIMR 0.1777 2.1220 0.0402
GFSS -0.1136 -2.4320 0.0197
GCOH1 -0.1897 -1.0010 0.3232
GGDP 0.1132 1.5040 0.1408
OPEN -0.0001 -1.1560 0.2548
R-square: 0.4498  Adj R-sq: 0.3087
 N=50
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insignificantly different from zero. In some cases insignificant variables are left in the model if the
apparent lack of a relationship is itself of interest.  In addition all the regressions were corrected
for the presence of heteroskedasticity using White’s generalized approach. 
With extreme caution we could also introduce a simple dynamic structure into this basic model as
well. Including lags of the exogenous variables allows for lagged responses to changes (although a
10-year lag in response seems to be quite extreme), although it exhausts quite a few degrees of
freedom in the estimation.  The short time dimension of the data makes it more difficult to
confidently include lagged dependent variables into the model. If the dynamics vary from country
to country and these idiosyncrasies are not taken into account then a simultaneity bias will be
introduced into the estimation due to correlation between the error term and the explanatory
variables.  With our three decades we could instrument for the lagged dependent variable but
would be left with very few observations (only one observation for each country) which is
problematical in itself.  Thus we restrict our exploration of the dynamics to lags in response to
exogenous variables as well as examining whether or not the growth rates depend on certain
initial conditions.  After several specifications are explored we find that the dynamic models are
quite unsatisfactory. Not only are there more parameters to estimate with substantially fewer
observations, but there are no significant and interesting results that could lead to greater insight.
Thus we rely on a static model for the remainder of this analysis.
Results
There are N=50 observations for all regressions.  The first regression estimated is the first-stage
model of the growth of the total fertility rate.  As we are not conducting any tests of hypotheses
on the estimated coefficients parsimony is less important and a variety of control variables are
included.  In addition, several fixed effects dummies were significant (or almost so) and were
allowed to remain in the regression.TABLE A2.5
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: GFLP
Variable Parameter est. t-statistic Prob > |T|
INTERCEPT -0.0080 -0.8450 0.4028
GMPR 2.1068 2.7520 0.0086
GTFRIV -1.0109 -2.3340 0.0242
GFSH 0.2200 2.5790 0.0133
GCOH1 -0.4650 -1.2550 0.2161
GCOH2 0.5996 1.4360 0.1580
 N=50
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Table A2.5 presents the results of the second stage regression, omitting the time effects:
Readers are reminded that a general-to-simple methodology has been adopted and these represent
only the final regressions. Thus none of the macro control variables were found to be significant in
the second regression.  Also interesting is the finding that secondary schooling seems to be
important in the fertility equation, while it is completion of higher schooling that is important in
the labor force participation decision.  The signs of the variables are consistent with our priors as
well.  Higher growth of the labor force participation among men is associated with higher
participation among women.  The growth fertility rates is inversely related to female labor force
participation.  The cohort (age) variables are not statistically significant in the regression.
However they suggest that increases in the 35-40 year old cohort is associated with higher
participation.  Earlier regressions in which female labor force participation was modeled as only a
function of cohort changes yielded similar, insignificant coefficient estimates.
As we have noted above, Bolivia has been omitted from the analysis due to some clearly outlying
data. However it is possible that there are other countries in the sample with peculiar relationships
between the variables in question that may have a disproportionate effect on our results and lead
us to general conclusion that is in fact an idiosyncratic feature of only one country.  To check for
such outlier countries we systematically delete one country at a time from the data set and redo
the regression analysis.  The average error-sum-of-squares is then compared for the remaining
data for each omitted country.  Countries who have had a disproportionately large impact on the
estimated regressors will display error-sums-of-squares for the remaining data estimates that is
substantially lower than the average value.  The result of this exercise is that we find the error-
sum-of-squares of the regression analysis excluding Mexico (at .00055) is 2.2 standard deviationsTABLE A2.6
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: GFLP
(With time effects, excluding Mexico)
Variable Parameter est. t-statistic Prob > |T|
INTERCEPT 0.0089 0.0777 0.4419
GMPR 0.8529 1.2640 0.2139
GTFRIV -1.2772 -3.5040 0.0012
GFSH 0.1468 1.8270 0.0754
GCOH1 -0.9159 -2.4150 0.0205
GCOH2 0.1050 0.2130 0.8326
DECADE2 -0.0276 -2.7130 0.0099
DECADE3 -0.0095 -0.9450 0.3507
 N=47
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lower than the average value (.00062).  Thus we examine the regression results excluding both
Bolivia and Mexico and find, as illustrated in table 3, that in fact the coefficient on GCOH2
(growth of the cohort from 35 to 40 years of age) is positive and significant. Further analysis
confirms that the lack of significance of previous regressions was due to the influence of Mexico
and its idiosyncratic demographic/ labor force participation relationship.  The results are
consistent with our intuition.  
  TABLE A2.7
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: GFLP
(Without time effects, excluding Mexico)
Variable Parameter est. t-statistic Prob > |T|
INTERCEPT -0.0079 -0.8760 0.3864
GMPR 1.4769 2.1490 0.0376
GTFRIV -1.2158 -3.3920 0.0015
GFSH 0.1718 2.2430 0.0304
GCOH1 -0.5382 -1.5850 0.1206
GCOH2 0.7391 1.9510 0.0579
 N=47
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As previously discussed, the model specification was arrived at by a systematic reduction in the
list of dependent variables. However, with a new sample size this reduction may no longer be
valid so we redo the entire analysis excluding Mexico in order to test whether or not some of our
macro control variables may now be significant.  Without Mexico in the sample we find no
evidence of significant heteroskedasticity in the regressions. However the exclusion does not
change the lack of significant coefficient estimates on the macro control variables.
All of the results contained herein are subject to the caveat that due to data scarcity we are
examining only the static, contemporaneous correlation of the average annual growth rates over
ten years of  the variables. Thus we have not taken into account any dynamic process, nor have
we been able to capture any short-run relationships that may exist.
The main conclusion we extract from all these robustness tests to our basic result is that the age
composition of the population has a significant impact on female participation rates after
controlling for several econometric problems.  Increases in the middle age cohort is associated
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Figure A2.1
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INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES
Independent Variable           Dependent Variable: Gini Coefficient
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Method of Estimation fe fe fe fe fe fe
Macro Control Variables
Unemployment Rate 0.597 0.45 0.55 0.53 0.46 0.56
(3.7) (2.6) (3.14) (3.1) (2.5) (3.3)
Inflation (Bounded) -2.200 0.98 1.08 1.43 1.21 -1.20
(-0.54) (0.26) (0.3) (0.4) (.30) (0.3)
Real Minimum Wage -0.034 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.20
(-2.03) (-2.16) (-2.03) (-2.15) (-2.0) (-1.9)
Education
Average Years of Education 43.14 35.97 32.76 44.97 40.18
(2.26) (1.9) (1.9) (2.1) (2.2)
Squared Average Years of Education -23.17 -20.90 -18.19 -24.84 -21.60
(-1.83) (-1.8) (-1.7) (-1.1) (-1.9)
Demographic Variables
% WAP in 15-29 Age Group -0.44
(-1.9)
% WAP in 30-44 Age Group 0.47
(1.9)
% WAP in 45-59 Age Group 0.29
(1.8)
% WAP in 60-65 Age Group 0.65
(2.4)
Constant 50.4 40.0 63.6 28.2 34.5 16.2
(16.0) (8.4) (4.7) (3.5) (1.2) (1.5)
R-squared 0.25 0.44 0.48 0.47 0.44 0.50
Number of Observations 73 73 73 73 73 73
* 't' Statistics in parenthesis
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3.2 Econometric Results
Londoño and Székely (1997) showed that changes in income inequality in Latin America are
well explained by macroeconomic variables and education. For the purposes of this work we
use an econometric specification similar to theirs, and expand it by introducing demographic
variables.
The exercise is performed by using the data set put together by Londoño and Székely
(1997a), which consists on 73 observations from the Deininger-Squire data set, plus 40The countries in the sample are The Bahamas, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican
45
Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Peru and Venezuela.
 On average, there is one observation per country every four  years, but there are differences between
46
countries. For instance, Venezuela has 22 surveys from 1970-1995, while Guatemala has only 3. There are also
countries like The Bahamas, Brazil, and Costa Rica with 10 or more observations (which gives an average of one
observation almost every two years). The remaining countries have one survey approximately every 4 years.
Data on unemployment and wages are from ILO (various years). Inflation is calculated from the World
47
Penn Tables. Education indicators were taken from the Barro-Lee (1996) data set, while the demographic variables
come from UN (1997).
71
observations obtained directly from household surveys . The expanded data set consists of
45
113 Gini coefficients belonging to 13 countries from 1970-1995, which covers 83% of the
Latin American population. The panel includes 31 observations for the 1970s, 43 for the
1980s, and 39 for the 1990s.  The criteria for including countries in the sample was that the
46
income distribution indicator fulfills at least the following minimum requirements: (I) it is
obtained from a household survey, (ii) it contains information on all income sources, (iii) the
unit of observation is  the household or the individual, and (iv) it is representative at the
national level. By fulfilling these requirements we minimize measurement error bias.
Table A3.1 presents our results . The first set of variables captures changes in the
47
macroeconomic environment. Specifically, we control for inflation, the minimum wage (to
capture the economic cycle) and changes in unemployment. We then introduce education and
education squared because we know from section I in this work that the relation between
education progress and inequality is non-linear. To capture the effects of demographics we
introduce the population share of various age groups. The number of observations is reduced
to 73 since we do not have information on education and unemployment for all the years for
which we have data on distribution.
We estimate the regression using fixed effects because our intention is to identify whether
changes in age structure of a population within a given country affect the distribution of
income. We performed the regressions using random effects to check for the robustness of
our results. The coefficients passed the Hausman test comfortably.72
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